The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the applicability of section 319 of the M.P. Municipalities Act, 1961 in relation to the limitation period for filing a suit against the Municipal Council.

Alok Aradhe, J.

1. This appeal is by the plaintiff which was admitted by a Bench of this Court on the following substantial question of law:

“Whether on the basis of material on record the suit can be said to be barred by limitation?”.

2. The facts, giving rise to filing of the appeal, briefly stated are that the plaintiff was employed as upper division clerk in Nagar Panchayat, Sohagpur and superannuated on 31-10-1997. The Local Self Administration, Government of M.P. vide an order dated 11-3-1996 clarified that it has no objection to grant leave encashment to the employees of the local bodies. Thereafter, the Nagar Panchayat passed a resolution by which it was decided to extend the benefit of earned leave to its employees. On 27-6-1996 the plaintiff was entitled to 240 days' earned leave. The plaintiff thereupon filed an application for encashment of earned leave. However, the aforesaid application was rejected vide order dated 17-2-1997. Thereafter the plaintiff filed the suit on 9-9-1998 seeking the relief of declaration that he is entitled to receive a sum of Rs. 45,200 on account of leave encashment for a period from 1-1-1997 to 30-4-1997 along with interest.

3. The defendants 3, 4 and 5 denied the claim of the plaintiff. The defendant No. 6 in its written statement raised an objection with regard to maintainability of the suit on the ground that no notice under section 319 of the M.P. Municipalities Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') has been given to the defendant No. 6 before institution of the suit, therefore, the suit is not maintainable.

4. The trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 16-5-2002 inter alia held that the plaintiff is entitled to a sum of Rs. 42,200/- on account of leave encashment. It was further held that the suit filed by the plaintiff is maintainable in the absence of notice under section 319 of the Act. Accordingly, the suit filed by the plaintiff was partly decreed. The lower appellate Court inter alia held that on 17-2-1997 the application preferred by the plaintiff was rejected by the defendant No. 6 Municipal Council. However, the plaintiff had not filed the suit within a period of eight months therefrom but has filed the same on 9-9-1998 and therefore, the suit is barred by limitation. Accordingly, the claim of the plaintiff was dismissed.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the lower Appellate Court grossly erred in reversing the well reasoned judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and in not appreciating the fact that the suit filed by the plaintiff was within limitation. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the suit filed by the plaintiff was barred by limitation in view of section 319(2) of the Act and mere submission of repeated representations, does not give rise fresh cause of action. It is further submitted that the lower Appellate Court in the facts of the case rightly held that the suit filed by the plaintiff is barred by limitation. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on the decision in Sadanandan Bhadran v. Madhavan Sunil Kumar, 1998(2) MPLJ (S.C.) 422 = (1998) 6 SCC 514 and has also invited the attention of this Court to paragraphs 4 and 9 of the aforesaid decision.

6. I have considered the respective submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. The relevant extract of section 319 of the Act reads as under:

“319. Bar of suit in absence of notice - (1) No suit shall be instituted against any Council or any Councillor, officer or servant thereof or any person acting under the direction of any such Council, Councillor, officer or servant for anything done or purporting to be done under this Act, until the expiration of two months next after a notice, in writing, stating the cause of action, the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff and the relief which he claims, has been, in the case of a Council delivered or le