1. Challenge in this petition is made to the order dated 31.7.2015, whereby the Tahsildar in pursuant to his earlier order dated 14.7.2014 passed a detailed order against the petitioners.

2. Brief facts necessary for adjudication of this matter are that respondents No.3 to 6 filed an application before Tahsildar, contending that in between the land of petitioners and respondents No.3 to 6, there exists a route of 15 ft. wide and thereafter there exists the land of petitioners bearing survey Nos.273, 274, 275, 276, 278, 266 and 260. It is stated in the said application that the said route in between the land of parties is in existence for last 50 years. The parties are using this route for ingress and egress and same has wrongly been blocked by the petitioners. Thus, the application aforesaid was filed with a prayer of reopening of the route. The said application was registered by respondent No.2 as Case No.3/13-14/A-13. The respondent No.2 passed an interim order dated 30.7.2014. Against this order, admittedly, the petitioners have filed a revision before the Commissioner, Gwalior Division, Gwalior. The revision is admittedly pending consideration before the Commissioner.

3. Respondents No.3 to 6 filed an application dated 15.7.2015 before the Tahsildar seeking compliance of earlier order dated 30.7.2014. The present petitioners filed reply stating that against the order dated 30.7.2014, revision is pending before the competent authority and, therefore, matter be kept in abeyance. The respondent No.2 passed the impugned order in exercise of power under section 132 of M.P. Land Revenue Code (for short, the “Code”) and directed to pay Rs.1,000/- as fine for not following the order dated 30.7.2014 and the Revenue Inspector was directed to approach the place with police authorities for opening the route. The expenses incurred in aforesaid exercise by revenue/police authorities was directed to be recovered from present petitioners as arrears of land revenue. In addition, both the parties were directed to submit bond of Rs.10,000/- each as per sections 107 and 116 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

4. Shri N.K. Gupta, learned senior counsel advanced singular contention. He submits that although their exists a remedy under the Code to assail the order dated 31.7.2015, this petition is directly filed because the order is without authority, jurisdiction and competence. He submits that as per section 131 of the Code, the Tahsildar is required to conduct a local enquiry and decide the matter finally. It is urged that section 132 can be availed only when a decision is being disobeyed. It is urged that the order dated 30.7.2014 cannot be treated as a ‘decision’ as per sections 131 and 132 of the Code. Thus, the order impugned is without jurisdiction. He placed reliance on the judgment of Supreme Court, reported in AIR 1961 SC 1795 (Tirumalachetti Rajaram v. Tirumalachetti Radhakrishnayya Chetty and others). He also relied on another judgment of Supreme Court in Smt. Ramkanya Bai and another v. Jagdish and others, reported in (2011)7 SCC 452.

5. Per Contra, Shri R.B.S. Tomar and Shri Raja Sharma, learned counsel for the State and respondents No.3 to 6, respectively, supported the impugned order. They contended that the word “decide” and “decision”, used in sections 131 and 132 of the Code must be read as per its literal meaning. Even if an interlocutory application is decided, it is a decision on the said application. Reliance is placed on AIR 1961 SC 1795 (Tirumalachetti Rajaram v. Tirumalachetti Radhakrishnayya Chetty and others). Shri Sharma also relied on the judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court, reported in AIR 2002 AP 224 (Divisional Forest Officer, Eluru v. District Judge, West Godavari Distt. and others). The Gujarat High Court judgment in Shanabhai Shivabhai Thakore and others v. Mukeshbhai Ramanbhai and another, reported in (1978)19 GLR 85, is relied upon to contend that the meaning of “to decide” is to (i) render a judgment on