The independence of confiscation proceedings from criminal prosecutions and the ability to continue confiscation proceedings during the pendency of a criminal case.

Sanjay Yadav, J.

1. Petitioner seeks quashment of proceedings for confiscation of Vehicle bearing registration No. MP09KB2936 Model TATA 407 Truck.

2. The vehicle in question was found carrying teak wood on 24.02.2015. As the transportation was found to be without proper authority the vehicle and the teak wood was seized by the Forest Authorities at village Gawakheda, Forest Range Ashta, Forest Division Sehore. Forest offence was registered vide POR No.22283/2006 punishable under Section 2 (4) (A), 52 of Indian Forest Act, 1927; under Section 5/15 of Madhya Pradesh Vanopaj (Vpayar Viniyaman) Adhiniyam, 1969. That a confiscation proceedings has been initiated under Section 15 of Adhiniyam, 1969.

3. Contention on behalf of the petitioner is that because of the initiation of criminal proceedings simultaneous proceedings for seizure of the vehicle and the material (teak wood) seized is impermissible in view of the decision in Premdas s/o Mangaldas Bairagi v. State of M. P. and others: 2013 (2) MPLJ 218, wherein co-ordinate Bench of our High Court relying on the decision in Madhukar Rao s/o Malik Rao v. State of M. P. and others: 2000 (1) MPLJ (FB) 289 and Principal Chief Conservator of Forest And another v. J. K. Johnson and others: AIR 2012 SC 61, has quashed such proceedings.

4. The issue in Madhukar Rao (supra) was: whether a vehicle or vessel, etc. seized under Section 50 (1) (c) of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, is put beyond the power of the Magistrate to direct its release during the pendency of trial in exercise of powers under Section 451 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. This is evident from the decision by the Full Bench in Madhurkar Rao (supra) and its affirmation by the Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh and others v. Madhukar Rao; (2008) 14 SCC 624.

5. Thus the issue as to whether confiscation proceedings can simultaneously be continued during pendency of criminal case was not the issue in Madhukar Rao (supra). The said issue as to whether confiscation proceedings can simultaneously be continued during pendency of criminal case, is no more res integra. In State of M.P. v. S.P. Sales Agencies and others: AIR 2004 SC 2088 it has been held:

"10. In the present case, the allegations are that by committing breach of rule 3 a forest offence within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act has been committed for which a criminal prosecution under rule 29 of the Transit Rules as well as a confiscation proceeding under Section 52 of the Act could be initiated. From the scheme of the Act, it would appear that for contravention of rule 3, two independent actions are postulated one criminal prosecution and the other confiscation proceeding. The power of confiscation, exercisable under Section 52 of the Act, cannot be said to be in any manner dependant upon launching of criminal prosecution as it has nowhere been provided therein that the forest produce seized can be confiscated only after criminal prosecution is launched, but the condition precedent for initiating a confiscation proceeding is commission of forest offence, which, in the case on hand, is alleged to have been committed. Reference in this connection may be made to a decision of this Court in the case of Divisional Forest Officer & Anr., v. G.V. Sudhakar Rao and others, (1985) 4 SCC 573, wherein it has been clearly laid down that the two proceedings are quite separate and distinct and initiation of confiscation proceeding is not dependant upon launching of criminal prosecution. In the said case, the Court observed thus: "The conferral of power of confiscation of seized timber or forest produce and the implements etc. on the Authorised Officer under sub-section (2-A) of Section 44 of the Act on his being satisfied that a forest offence had been committed in respect thereof, is not dependent upon whether a criminal prosecution for commission of a forest offence has been launched against the offender or not. It is a separate and distinct proceeding fro