Non-applicant Shivlal who was the Bhumiswami of suit lands, sold the same to the applicant by a registered sale-deed dated 8-4-1969 for Rs. 6,000, delivered possession of the land to the applicant defendant in pursuance of the sale and also got the name of the applicant mutated in the revenue record. On 5-11-1973, Shivlal filed a suit against the applicant for a declaration that the aforesaid sale did not bind him and also claimed the relief of possession. The suit was based, inter alia, on the allegations that the sale was effected merely to secure a loan from the applicant who happened to be a money lender. It was urged on behalf of the applicant that the sale-deed to which the plaintiff was a party, if left outstanding, was bound to be injurious to the interest of the plaintiff and it was necessary for him to ask for the relief of its cancellation as contemplated by section 31 of the Specific Relief Act.

Held : According to this section, to entitle a plaintiff to get a decree of cancellation of an instrument, three points must be made good by him viz. (a) that the instrument is void or voidable; (b) that the plaintiff has reasonable apprehension that the instrument if left outstanding, may cause him serious injuries and (c) that the Court ought, in the circumstances of the case, to order it to be delivered up and cancelled. There is no doubt that in order to determine the proper Court-fee payable on the plaint in a particular case and whether the Court has jurisdiction to try the case, the true principle is that the plaint, as a whole, should be looked at and it is the substance of the plaint and not its ostensible form which matters. It is true further that caution must be observed so that nothing is imported into the plaint which it really does not contain either actually or by necessary implication. It is also well established that in construing the plaint, the Court must take the plaint as it is and not as it ought to have been. There is a difference between a suit for the cancellation of an instrument and one for a declaration that the instrument is not binding on the plaintiff. When the plaintiff seeks to establish a title in himself and cannot establish that title without removing an inseparable obstacle such as a decree or deed to which he has been a party or by which he is otherwise bound, then quite clearly he must get that decree or deed cancelled or declared void in toto and his suit is in substance a suit for the cancellation of the decree or deed notwithstanding the fact that the suit may have been framed as a suit for declaration. On the other hand, when the plaintiff is seeking to establish a title and finds himself threatened by a decree or transaction between third parties, he is not in a position to get that decree or a deed cancelled in toto. The proper remedy in such a case is to get a dec1aration that the decree or deed is invalid so far as he himself is concerned and not for the cancellation of the decree or the deed. In the light of this legal position, in the opinion of this Court, considering the facts and the circumstances of the case, it was necessary for the plaintiff to ask for the relief of cancellation of the sale-deed as this has an important beating on the question on the pecuniary jurisdiction of the trial Court. Sukhlal v. Devi Lal and others, AIR 1954 Raj. 170, Mahadeo Deoji and another v. Nana Benaji and another, 33 MPLC 248 : AIR 1946 Nag. 359, Tirupathi v. Lakeshmana, AIR 1953 Mad. 545, Ramanathan v. Ramanathan, AIR 1947 Mad. 57, relied on. Mangilal v. Sarvan Singh, MPLJ SN 104, distinguished.

2. This Court is aware regarding the scope of revision under section 115 CPC. If the lower Court has exercised its jurisdiction either illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court can certainly invoke its jurisdiction. Ratilal v. Ranchhodbhai, AIR 1966 SC 439, D.L.F. Housing and Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. Saran Singh and others, AIR 1971 SC 2324, M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapur,