1. The material facts giving rise to this appeal briefly are an follows:

Gumtis Nos. 37 to 49, situated at Maharani Road, Indore, were erected by the plaintiff without obtaining prior permission from the Municipal Council, Indore, as required by the provisions of section 112 of the M. B. Municipalities Act, 1954. Under the provisions of sub-section (7) of section 112, the plaintiff became liable to be prosecuted. That provision further laid down that, on conviction, the Municipal Council could by a written notice require the plaintiff to demolish the structure. It is not disputed before me that the plaintiff was not prosecuted for an offence punishable under section 112(7) of the aforesaid Act. The M. B. Municipalities Act, 1954, was repealed by the M. P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, which in turn was repealed by the M. P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956. On 24th October 1963, the Corporation sent a notice to the tenants of the plaintiff intimating that the Gumtis would be demolished on 25th October 1963. The plaintiff, therefore, instituted a suit for grant of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from demolishing the Gumtis. The suit was resisted by the defendants. The trial Court held that after the coming into force of the M. P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, hereinafter referred to as the Act, the defendants were empowered under the provisions of section 305 of the Act to demolish the Gumtis in question and, in this view of the matter, dismissed the plaintiff's suit. On appeal, the lower appellate Court held that as the defendants had failed to prosecute the plaintiff under the provisions of section 112 (7) of the M. B. Municipalities Act, 1954, a vested right had accrued to the plaintiff. In this view of the matter, the lower appellate Court passed a decree for perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from demolishing the Gumtis in question. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court, the defendants have preferred this appeal.

Held : Shri Jhanjaria learned counsel for the appellants, contended that the lower appellate Court erred in law in holding that the plaintiff had acquired a vested right that his Gumtis could not be demolished. The contention must be upheld. There is no question of any vested right as fairly conceded by Shri Chaphekar, learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent. The real question for consideration is whether the Corporation is empowered under the provisions of section 307 (2) of the Act as that is the only provision relied upon by the Corporation to take proceedings for demolition of the Gumtis which were erected without obtaining any sanction in that behalf.

2. Now, it is not disputed that the Gumtis were erected before the Act came into force. The provisions contained in section 307 (1) of the Act are by their language of prospective operation and the Corporation cannot rely upon these provisions for demolishing a structure which was admittedly erected prior to the coming into force of the Act. Learned counsel for the Corporation referred to the provisions of section 3 (2) of the Act and contended that a notice issued under the repealed Act shall be deemed to be a notice issued under the corresponding provisions of the Act. In the instant case however, it has not come on record that any notice was issued by the defendants under the repealed Act for demolition of the Gumtis. Moreover, such a notice, even if it had been issued, could not be considered to be a notice under section 112 (7) of the M. B. Municipalities Act, 1954, as such a notice could be issued only after conviction of the defaulter and in the instant case it is admitted that the plaintiff was not convicted under section 112 (7) of that Act. The provisions of section 3 (2) of the Act cannot, therefore, be pressed into service in this case for holding that a notice given under the repealed Act could be considered to be a notice under section 307 of the Act. It must, theref