1. The first argument of Shri A.R. Choubey, learned counsel for the appellant, is that the application dated 11.3.1969 made by the defendant in the trial Court for amendment of paragraph 3 of the written statement was wrongly rejected by the trial Court and thereafter also by the first appellate Court. I am unable to accept this argument. By the proposed amendment stated in the application, the defendant in substance wanted to plead that Dhansingh during his life time on 16.6.1962 gave the suit land to the defendant and that is how the defendant became its exclusive owner to say the least, such an amendment could not be allowed for the simple reason that the same would introduce a new case for which no cogent reason was given by the defendant. Obviously, the pleading was based on the personal knowledge of the defendant himself and there is no satisfactory reason given to explain why such a case was not pleaded initially and it was attempted to introduce the same against the a foresaid plea in this manner by amendment. The amendment was, therefore rightly rejected by both the Courts below as the same, if allowed, would introduce a new set of ideas which could not be permitted by way of amendment A.K. Gupta and Sons Ltd. vs. Damodar Valley Corporation, AIR 1967 SC 96 and M/s. Modi Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. and Another vs. M/s. Ladha Ram and Co. AIR 1977 SC 680.

2. The next argument of Shri Choubey is that the suit lands were validly exchanged by Darai with the defendant such an exchange being permissible under section 167 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. This provision only indicates that exchange of land between Bhumiswamis is permissible under the Code. That, however, does not deal with the mode of the transaction which is governed by the general law. Under the general law an exchange of immovable property amounts to a conveyance which requires registration in accordance with section 17 of the Indian Registration Act. Shri Choubey, however, argues that want of registration was not fatal to the admissibility of Ex.D-1 dated 7.8.1964 executed by Darai since it merely records a past family arrangement. In my opinion, this argument cannot be accepted. The document Ex.D-1 read with paragraph 3 of the written statement as suggested by Shri Choubey himself clearly indicates that the same was executed for the purpose of transferring the title of Darai in the suit land to the defendant. It is sufficient to say that such a case of a past family arrangement was not even thought of earlier by the defendant and in para 3 of the written statement where this document is referred, there is no case of family arrangement set up. It is, therefore, not possible to treat this document as indicating a past family arrangement. As earlier stated, the defendant's case as pleaded in the written statement is of exclusive title in the suit land of Darai as a result of division between Darai and the defendant of Dhansingh's properties including the suit land inherited by them in 1962 and thereafter transfer of the suit land by Darai to the defendant so as to confer exclusive title on the defendant in this manner. The argument now advanced has no foundation in the pleadings and must fail for that reason alone. Appeal dismissed.