Facts essential for purposes of this revision are that the plaintiff filed a suit on the ground under section 12(1)(f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) in para 4 whereof it was stated that the plaintiff requires the suit shop for starting Kirana business. It was also stated that this business will be done through servants and therefore, plaintiff's son Omprakash, the defendant field written statement denying the claim of the plaintiff.

2. At the trial stage, the plaintiff applied for amendment praying that:-

(1) the averment that the plaintiff will also get the shop run by his son Omprakesh be deleted.

(2) it be added that the plaintiff is possessed of sufficient capital and means for running the business in question, and

(3) that by installing electric connection the defendant has during the pendency of the suit done an act which is likely to affect adversely and substantially interests of the plaintiff-landlord.

These amendment were opposed by the defendant but by the impugned order the aforesaid amendments have been allowed. Hence this revision.

3. Shri K.N. Gupta, learned counsel for the defendant applicant submits that the first amendment is malafide, the second amendment is unnecessary and the third amendment cannot be allowed because it is based on subsequent event. Shri K.L. Mangal, learned counsel for the plaintiff non-applicant argued in support of the impugned order.

Held : After having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that the revision deserves to be partly allowed.

4. As to the first contention, suffice it to say that the need as laid in the plaint is that of the plaintiff-landlord. What was further stated was simply that the shop will be run by his son Om Prakash also. Therefore, with the deletion of the words that the business will also be managed by Om Prakash, the nature of the suit is not changed. The amendment also cannot be said to be malafide. Therefore, the contention as to the first amendment is devoid of substance.

5. This brings me to the second contention. There appears to be force in the submission with regard to the second amendment. Order 6 rule 17 permits those amendments only which may be necessary for purposes of determining real question and controversy between the parties.

6. Now the question is whether averment with regard to availability of the capital and means for running a business is postulate of law or not.

7. A bare reading of the section 12(1)(f) will disclose that it is not necessary to aver in the plaint that necessary means and capital for running any particular business are available to the landlord.

8. So far as the intention of the legislature goes, in respect of ground of reconstruction provided by section 12(1)(h) of the Act. By enacting subsection (7) of section 12 of the Act it has been expressly provided that no order for an eviction of a tenant shall be made on that ground unless among other things, the landlord proves that necessary funds for the purposes are available with him. In order to arrive at the conclusion that ground under section 12(2)(f) also requires an averment regarding the availability of necessary funds, but we will have to add the words that necessary funds for the purpose are available with the landlord. This cannot be done by any process of interpretation. The Courts cannot re-write a law or add something to the enacted law, in order to give a desired interpretation. Consequently, the averment regarding availability of capital and means is wholly unnecessary. This is the view which has been taken on the point by a Division Bench of this Court in the case reported in 1969 JLJ 693 (Babu Harisingh v. Ratanlal).

9. The second amendment deserves to be disallowed, on the ground that it is unnecessary for determination of the real controversy between the parties. To allow it will mean to introduce controversy which is not necessary according to the law.

10. This brings me to the third