Each case must be decided on its own evidence, and evidence from one case cannot be used in another without the parties' consent.

Heard with the consent of both the parties.

In this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has assailed the order dated 7-12-2016 passed in Civil Suit No. 130-A/2015 pending before the 10th Additional District Judge, Gwalior, whereby application filed by the petitioner under section 151 of Civil Procedure Code seeking consolidation of suits has been rejected.

2. The brief facts leading to filing of this case and relevant fact for the purpose of writ petition are that the respondent/plaintiff Dinesh Chandra Bansal has instituted a Suit bearing No. 41-A/2012 seeking declaration and permanent injunction to the effect that he is the owner of the suit land situated in Survey No. 346/1066 area 0.627 hectare. Subsequently, another Civil Suit bearing No. 32- A/2014 (new number 44-A/15) was instituted by the present petitioner/plaintiff therein seeking declaration and permanent injunction as well as declaring the sale deed dated 11-6-2008 and agreement dated 5-7-2017 be null and void. In this suit, the declaration has been sought not only in respect of the land situated in Khasra No. 346/1066 but also in Survey No. 331 area 0.596 and Suvey No. 430/2 area 1.735. The petitioner preferred an application under section 151 of Civil Procedure Code with the prayer to consolidate the aforesaid two suits and be decided analogously. The Court of 10th Additional District Judge, Gwalior, rejected the application under section 151 vide order dated 7-12-2016 which has been assailed on behalf of Udayraj in the present writ petition.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the dispute in both the suits is in respect of the same land and the parties are also same, therefore, in such a situation, the learned Court below ought to have allowed the application and consolidated both the suits. The learned trial Court erred in coming to the conclusion that both the suits are in different stages. In Civil Suit No. 44-A/15 no evidence has been recorded whereas in Suit No. 130-A/15 virtually the evidence has been recorded, therefore, both the suits cannot be consolidated.

4. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent Shri Anand Bharadwaj vehemently opposed the prayer and took this Court through the plaint of both the suits and pointed out that the suits are not of identical nature. The relief claimed are also different and the purpose are also different. He further submitted that both the suits cannot be tried together since they are at different stages. No jurisdictional error has been committed by the Court below in rejecting the application calling interference by this Court. In the circumstances, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaquim, (1983) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1984 SC 38. The counsel for the respondents has further relied on the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Parwati Bai v. Kriparam, 2009 (4) M.P.L.J. 144 : 2009 (5) MPHT 243 (DB) in support of his contention.

5. Heard the learned counsel for the parties.

6. Though, the consolidation of suits is not specifically provided in Code of Civil Procedure as applicable to the State of M.P., it may be achieved by invoking section 151 of Civil Procedure Code. The basic purpose for directing consolidation of suits is to firstly avoid conflicting judgments and secondly to save valuable time, energy and money by clubbing the cases involving common question together. In the present case, the evidence in Civil Suit No. 130-A/15 is already recorded in Civil Suit No. 130-A/15 cannot be utilized for the purpose of Civil Suit No. 44-A/15 except with the express consent of the parties concerned. Admittedly, in the present case no such consent has been given by the parties. It is a settled question of law as held by the Apex Court in the case of Mitthulal v. State of M.P., 1975 M.P.L.J. (S.C.) 137 : 1975 JLJ 432 that each case must b