The right of pre-emption can be extinguished not only by the specific mode laid down in the Bhopal Pre-emption Act, but also by waiver or estoppel under the general law.

1. It is plaintiff's second appeal against the decision of the District Judge, Bhopal in First Appeal No.96 of 1951, dismissing the suit for pre-emption of a sale of a house.

2. It is not necessary to state the facts and the pleas of the parties which are abundantly, clear from the judgments of the two Courts below. It is enough to state that in both the Courts the issues for decision were whether the house was sold for Rs.3,500 instead of Rs.4,500; whether the plaintiff had waived his right to pre-empt; whether the plaintiff was estopped by his conduct, from claiming preemption. Both the Courts below found these issues against the plaintiff who now comes up to this Court in appeal.

3. It is contended that the right of pre-emption could not be extinguished without a notice under S.14, Bhopal Pre-emption Act, and therefore, the findings, that the plaintiff had waived his right or was estopped from enforcing it for pre-emption were incorrect; that the finding on the question of waiver, by the plaintiff, was vitiated on the ground of misapprehension of evidence; that the evidence on the question of estoppel against the plaintiff was not properly examined and the finding thereon was vitiated by misapprehension and misappreciation of the evidence and lastly that the finding on the payment of the price of the sale was also so vitiated.

4. Taking up the first contention, the question is whether in the absence of a notice as required under S.14, Bhopal Pre-emption Act, being given by the intending vendor to the prospective pre-emptor, the vendor or the vendee could not plead or prove waiver or estoppel against the plaintiff. Sections 14 and 15, Bhopal Pre-emption Act, have to be read together. The former section provides for a notice by the intending vendor to the possible pre-emptor while the latter section provides for notice by the intending, pre-emptor to the vendor. It must appear that under S.14 it is laid down that:

"When any person proposes to sell etc.......any immovable property in respect of which any person has any right of pre-emption, he may give a notice to all such persons."

In the latter part of the section the procedure for giving such notice is laid down. Section 15 then lays down what the intending pre-emptor has then to do in reply to the notice which he receives. In my opinion, the giving of notice by the intending vendor to the possible pre-emptor is optional in view of the use of the word "may," a departure from S.19, Punjab Pre-emption Act, from which it appears that the section has taken. It is clear that if a notice is given it shall be given through the Civil Court. The effect of giving such notice together with the absence of any such action by the intending pre-emptor as laid down under S.15, Bhopal Pre-emption Act, is that the latter's right shall be extinguished. This is the mode in which the Act lays down how the right of pre-emption is extinguished. It is, however, nowhere laid down in the Act that such right will not be extinguished by any other mode or conduct of the parties under the principles of law as found in the general law of the land, e.g., by waiver by the claimant or estoppel against him. In short, the Bhopal Pre-emption Act only lays down a specific mode for extinguishing the right which, however, does not come in the way of the application of the general law as found in the Evidence Act or in Equity.

5. I feel myself supported in this view by the latest decision of a Full Bench of the ex-High Court of Bhopal, which is in Urdu and was brought to my notice. In Mohammad Assan v. Abdul Hamid Khan, civil Appeal No.40 of 1946 d/-29-4-1947, which was originally heard by a Single Judge (Ansari, J.) the question which was referred to a Full Bench was as follows :

"Whether the provisions of Ss.14 and 15 of the Bhopal Pre-emption Act override the provisions of estoppel under the Evidence Act in all cases and no help can be taken from the said provisions in pre-emption suits."

The Bench answered t