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MADHYA BHARAT HIGH COURT, INDORE BENCH
SHINDE, DIXIT, JJ.
Pushpadant - Applicant
Versus
Shakharam - Opponent
Civil Revn. No. 320 of 1951
Decided On : 26-04-1955

Advocates Appeared:
N.R. Newaskar, for Applicant
Chaphekar, for Opponent.

The failure of the Controller to pass an order under S. 9(2)(a) of the Sthan Niyantran Vidhan did not affect his jurisdiction to try the suit, and the period of limitation for filing an appeal under S. 9(3) of the Act included the time required for obtaining a copy of the order.

Headnote:

RENT CONTROL - Sthan Niyantran Vidhan, 2006 - Ss. 7, 9(2)(a), 9(3) - Fair rent determination - Appeal - Limitation - Exclusion of time for obtaining copy of order - Jurisdiction of Controller - Mandatory provision - Interpretation.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner challenged the order of the District Judge, Mandleshwar, which allowed the appeal filed by the non-applicant and fixed the fair rent at Rs. 7-8-0 per month. The petitioner contended that the Controller failed to pass an order under S. 9(2)(a) of the Sthan Niyantran Vidhan, requiring the tenant to deposit rent at the agreed rate until the decision of the suit, and that the appeal was time-barred as it was not filed within 30 days as prescribed under S. 9(3) of the Act.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the failure of the Controller to pass an order under S. 9(2)(a) did not affect his jurisdiction to try the suit, as the provision was merely mandatory and did not impose any restrictions on the jurisdiction of the Court. The court also held that the period of limitation for filing an appeal under S. 9(3) was to be computed in accordance with the provisions of the Limitation Act, and that the time required for obtaining a copy of the order could be excluded under S. 12(2) of the Act.

Issues: 1. Whether the Controller's failure to pass an order under S. 9(2)(a) of the Sthan Niyantran Vidhan affected his jurisdiction to try the suit. 2. Whether the period of limitation for filing an appeal under S. 9(3) of the Act included the time required for obtaining a copy of the order.

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The provision under S. 9(2)(a) of the Sthan Niyantran Vidhan, requiring the Controller to pass an order for the tenant to deposit rent at the agreed rate until the decision of the suit, was mandatory but did not affect the jurisdiction of the Controller. 2. The period of limitation for filing an appeal under S. 9(3) of the Act was to be computed in accordance with the provisions of the Limitation Act, and the time required for obtaining a copy of the order could be excluded under S. 12(2) of the Act.

Final Decision: The petition was dismissed with costs.

JUDGMENT :

SHINDE, J.

1. This is a petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution. The non-applicant applied for the determination of the fair rent under S. 7, Sthan Niyantran Vidhan Samvat 2006. The Controller fixed the rent at Rs. 13-8-0 per month. Against that decision an appeal was filed before the District Judge, Mandleshwar. The District Judge allowed the appeal and fixed the fair rent at Rs. 7-8-0 per month. Against this order this petition has been filed.

2. The learned counsel for the petitioner has raised two contentions. His first contention is that under S. 9(2)(a) of the Sthan Niyantran Vidhan after the institution of the suit it was incumbent on the Controller to pass an order that the tenant should deposit rent at the rate agreed upon between the parties until the decision of the suit. As such an order was not passed, the decision of the Controller is 'ultra vires' The second contention is that under S. 9(3) of the Sthan Niyantran Vidhan the appeal should have been filed within 30 days of the decision.

As the appeal has not been filed within the prescribed period, the appeal was time barred. It is now well settled that powers under Art. 227 of the Constitution are to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors (vide- 'Waryam Singh v. Amarnath', AIR, 1954 SC 215 (Pr. 14) (A). We have, therefore, to see whether the Courts below have transgressed the bounds of their jurisdiction in this case. The first contention relates to the non-compliance of an order contemplated by Sub-S. (2) (a) of S. 9, Sthan Niyantran Vidhan. This Sub-Section reads as follows :

Clause (c) of Sub-Section 2 (a) reads as follows :

Sub-Section 2(a) enjoins that after the institution of the suit the Controller shall give an order to the tenant to deposit rent in his office for the period dating from the institution of the suit till the decision of the suit. This provision, no doubt, appears to be mandatory. But it does not affect the jurisdiction of the Controller to try a suit. It is merely an error of law. Consequently even if the Controller fails to pass an order it does not affect his jurisdiction to try the suit.

The jurisdiction of the Controller does not depend upon passing of such an order. Sub-Section 2(c) also imposes a penalty upon the tenant in case of failure. This Sub-Section also does not impose any restrictions on the jurisdiction of the Court. In these circumstances there is no occasion to invoke powers under Art. 227 of the Constitution.

3. The second contention relates to the period of limitation. The argument of the learned counsel briefly is that the period of limitation for filing an appeal having been categorically fixed as 30 days, the period required for obtaining the copies of the order cannot be excluded in computing the period of limitation. This argument loses sight of the provisions of S. 29. Limitation Act. Section 29(2), Limitation Act, runs as follows :

"Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule, the provisions of S. 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefor in that schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law.

(a) the provisions contained in S. 4, Ss. 9 to 13, and S. 22 shall apply only in so far as and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law; and

(b) the remaining provisions of this act shall not apply."

That the Sthan Niyantran Vidhan is a special law cannot be disputed. The preamble of the Act itself makes this quite clear. The Sthan Niyantran Vidhan does not expressly exclude the provisions contained in S. 4, Ss. 9 to 18 and S. 22. Consequently these Sections are applicable to Sthan Niyantran Vidhan. Section 12(2), L









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