Offences under Sections 279 and 337/338, I.P.C. are distinct and separate, and a person can be convicted of both offences if they are committed in different transactions. However, if the offences are committed in the same transaction, the assessment of punishment will be governed by Section 71, I.P.C.

FACTS : Gulam Meer was on 13-8-1951 driving a motor truck on the Anjad-Indore Road. One Mangalram was driving a passenger bus vehicle No. 1041 on the same road from the opposite direction. There were in the passenger bus among others two lady passengers (1) Laxmibai P.W. 2 and (2) Sundarbai P.W. 3, sitting with their elbows protruding outside the vehicle. When the truck driven by Gulam Meer passed by the side of the passenger bus, the two vehicles collided and caused injuries to the aforesaid lady passengers.

Both Mangalram and Gulam Meer were put up for trial before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate Anjad for offences under Sections 279 and 338, I.P.C. The Magistrate acquitted Mangalram but convicted Gulam Meer under Section 279, I.P.C. and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 250. Gulam Meer appealed against his conviction and sentence to the Sessions Judge Nimar, who allowed the appeal and acquitted the respondent. The State has therefore preferred this appeal against his acquittal.

The Sessions Judge did not consider the merits of the case but acquitted the accused holding that as injuries were actually caused to the passengers the conviction of the accused under Section 279, I.P.C. could not be maintained. The Judge relied In support of this proposition on a division. Bench ruling of this Court reported in- 'State v. Jagdish', Madh.-B. LR 1952 Cri 302 (A) where it was held that in course of rash or negligent driving hurt is caused to any person, the driver could be convicted only under Section 337, I.P.C. and Section 279. I.P.C. would not apply.

The case was argued first before Samvatsar and Nevaskar, JJ., who being of the opinion that the view expressed by a Division Bench in- 'State v. Jagdish (A)', required to be reconsidered referred the following question to a Full Bench :

"(1) Whether a person guilty of rash and negligent driving on a public way in such manner as to endanger human life, cannot be convicted for the offence under Section 279, I.P.C. if in course of or by reason of such driving hurt is also caused to some person ?"

OPINION OF THE FULL BENCH

CHATURVEDI, J. :- (After stating the facts given above his Lordship proceeded.)

2. The question referred to the Full Bench is : Whether a person guilty of rash and negligent driving on a public road in such a manner as to endanger human life, cannot be convicted for the offence under Section 279, I.P.C., if in course of, or by reason of, such driving, hurt is also caused to some person ?

3. In other words, it is suggested that we should reconsider the decision of a Division Bench of this Court (Mehta and Khan JJ.) reported in 'Madh.-B. LR 1952 Cri 302 (A)'.

4. At page 303, it was observed by Mr. Khan, J. (Mehta J. concurring) that if any injury is not caused but the act was rash or negligent, the proper Section under which an indictment would lie is Section 279, I.P.C. But if a result of a rash or negligent act injury has been actually caused, the appropriate Section under which a person should be tried is Section 337, I.P.C.

A reference has been made in that judgment to page 887 of Gour's Penal Law of India (5th edition), where in Note 2924 it is stated that a person convicted of a major offence, that is an offence under Section 337 or Section 304, I.P.C. cannot be convicted of this offence (Section 279, I.P.C.) as well.

In his Penal Law of the British India (1936 edition), Sir Harisingh Gour makes a reference to- 'L.F. Collett v. Emperor', 1929 Mad WN 395 (B) in support of this proposition. The facts of that case were that on one night the appellant-Collett was drunk and was driving a car which hit from behind four Muslims, who were carrying an empty bier. Owing to the impact, the four persons received injuries on account of the seriousness of which two of the pall bearers died subsequently in the General Hospital, Madras.

The Second Presidency Magistrate, Madras, convicted the appellant under Sections 279, 337 and 304A, I.P.C. He was sentenced to six months' rigorous imp