MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT (INDORE BENCH)
T.C. Shrivastava, J
FATEHLAL – Appellant
Versus
FULCHAND – Respondent
C. Rev. No. 410 of 1959
Decided on : 13-01-1961
LIMITATION ACT - SECTION 14 - SUIT FOR RECOVERY OF AMOUNT DUE ON A PRONOTE - TIME TAKEN BY COURT TO MAKE ENDORSEMENT UNDER ORDER 7, RULE 10, ON THE PLAINT TO BE RETURNED CAN BE EXCLUDED.
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of amount due on a pronote, dated 17-12-48. The plaint was initially filed in the Court of the Civil Judge (First Class), Indore, but was returned on 30-9-54 as the cause of action arose in Dhar. The plaintiff appealed the order, but it was dismissed on 10-9-1958. The plaintiff then took back the plaint from the Indore Court on 4-12-58 and presented it in Dhar on the same date. The trial Court held that the time between 17-12-1951 and 4-12-1958 could be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the time taken by the Court to make the necessary endorsement under Order 7, rule 10, on the plaint to be returned can be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. However, if the plaint is ready for return after the necessary endorsement has been made and the plaintiff does not take it back, he cannot be considered to have prosecuted the proceedings with due diligence and would not be entitled to any exclusion of time after the plaint was ready for return.
Issues: Whether the time taken by the Court to make the necessary endorsement under Order 7, rule 10, on the plaint to be returned can be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act.
Ratio Decidendi: The court relied on the decisions in Ishwar Dayal Vs. Badri Lal, Neerendrabhooshan Lahiri Vs. Berhampur Oil Mills, Ltd., and Muslim Bank Vs. Hashan Shiraza to hold that the time taken by the Court to make the necessary endorsement under Order 7, rule 10, on the plaint to be returned can be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the petition for revision and held that the trial Court was right in holding that the claim was within time.
T.C. Shrivastava, J.—This petition for revision has been filed by the defendant against the order of the trial court dated II-9-1959, rejecting a preliminary objection raised by him that the suit was barred by time.
2. The non-applicant had filed the suit for recovery of amount due on a pronote, dated 17-12-48. Originally the plaint was filed on 17-12-1951 in the Court of the Civil Judge (First Class), Indore. On inquiry the Court came to the conclusion that the case of action arose in Dhar and therefore ordered on 30-9-54 to return the plaint for presentation to proper Court. An appeal against the order was filed by the plaintiff which was dismissed on 10-9-1958. The plaintiff then took back the plaint from the Indore Court on 4-12-58 and presented it in Dhar on the same date. The trial Court has held that u/s 14 of the Indore Limitation Act the plaintiff was entitled to exclude the time during which the proceedings in Indore Court and the subsequent proceedings in appeal were pending. Accordingly, the time between 17-12-1951 and 4-12-1958 was exluded and the claim was held within time.
3. I may state that in the grounds of revision the question of the pronote being unstamped was also raised; but this point was not argued before me.
4. Shri S. L. Garg for the applicant conceded before me that the time from 17-12-1951 to 30-9-1958 could be excluded u/s 14 of the Limitation Act, but argued that the time between 30-9-1958 and 4-12-1958 cannot be so excluded, as those proceedings ended on 30-9-1958. The delay in taking back the plaint was entirely due to, the plaintiff's fault and he cannot therefore be deemed to have prosecuted the proceedings with due deligence within the meaning of Section 14, Reliance is placed on Rama Adhin Vs. Gulzari Singh (A, I. R. 1946 Oudh 116) and Hamida Bibi Vs. Fatima Bibi (A. I. R. 1918 All. 280, In the first case, the order of the trial Court ordering the return of the plaint was taken up in appeal and subsequently in revision. The revision was decided on 12-8-1958 and the plaint was returned on 26-9-1958. On the facts in that case, it was held that the plaintiff did not act with due deligence and could not therefore claim exclusion of the time after 12-8-1958. In the second case, the Small Cause Court had directed return of the plaint, but the plaintiff refused to take it back and filed a revision in the High Court. After the decision of the High Court, the plaintiff did not take back the plaint for three months. It was held that the plaintiff was not justified in refusing to take back the plaint from the Court of the Small Causes and therefore the time was not allowed to be excluded.
5. In Jafar Uddin Vs. Debi Prasad and Another, the extreme view is taken that the plaintiff is entitled to exclude the time till the date of actual return of the plaint to him. In Sabbu Naidu Vs. Varadarajulu Naidu ( I. L. R. 1947 Mad. 694) it has been held that the period to be excluded u/s 14 is till the date of the endorsement by the Court under Order 7, rule 10 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, and not the date of the actual taking of the return of the plaint. The same view has been taken in Babanna Gurusangappa Vs. Channappa Chanmallappa and Others, in which it has been held that the period between the pronouncement in the Court of the want of jurisdiction and the return of the plaint for presentation to proper Court is allowable as time u/s 14, subject to this overriding qualifications that during that period, as during any other the plaintiff must be prosecuting his suit with due deligence. In Ishwar Dayal Vs. Badri Lal, . Neerendrabhooshan Lahiri Vs. Berhampur Oil Mills, Ltd., and Muslim Bank Vs. Hashan Shiraza ( A. I. R. 1951 Hyd 57) it has been held that the time taken by Court to make the necessary endorsement under Order 7, rule 1,; on the plaint to be returned can be excluded.
6. From these decisions it is clear that the proceedings do not end on the date on which an order for return of the plaint is p
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