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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
PARKASH SHRIVASTAVA, J.
Hope Textiles Ltd. - Appellant
Versus
Dashrath - Respondent
W.P. No. 4824 of 2017
Decided on : 10-10-2017
Advocate Appeared:
For the Appellant : S.C. Bagadia, Shri Prateek Patwardhan, Counsel
The expressed language of a statute cannot be ignored, and welfare legislation should be interpreted keeping in view the object of the Act.
Headnote:
Payment of Gratuity Act - Challenge to Controlling Authority and Appellate Order - Section 2A, Section 2(c) - Summary of Acts and Sections: The court discussed the applicability of the amended Section 2A of the Payment of Gratuity Act and its retrospective nature. It also considered the interpretation of continuous service under Section 2(c) and its application to the service rendered prior to the amendment. The court highlighted the expressed language of the amended section and the welfare nature of the legislation, along with supporting judgments from the Madras High Court and the Karnataka High Court. The court rejected the petitioner's argument that the amended provision would not apply to services rendered prior to the amendment, emphasizing that the authorities had not committed any error in calculating continuous service under the amended provisions.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner challenged the order of the Controlling Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act dated 24.10.2013 and the appellate order dated 23.5.2017, regarding the calculation of gratuity and the last drawn salary.
Finding of the Court:
The court dismissed the writ petitions, holding that the amended Section 2A of the Payment of Gratuity Act would apply to the services rendered prior to the amendment. It also found no grounds for interference in the orders of the controlling authority or the appellate authority.
Issues: Challenge to Controlling Authority and Appellate Order under the Payment of Gratuity Act, Applicability of Amended Section 2A, Calculation of Last Drawn Salary
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the amended Section 2A of the Payment of Gratuity Act would apply to the services rendered prior to the amendment and found no grounds for interference in the orders of the controlling authority or the appellate authority.
Final Decision: The writ petitions were dismissed.
Parkash Shrivastava, J.
This court by the previous order had allowed the application for amendment but the amendment has not been incorporated, instead an I.A. seeking permission to file the amended petition has been filed but no amended petition has been filed with the I.A.
2. Considering the circumstances of the case, arguments on admission and interim relief is heard taking into account the plea sought to be incorporated by way of amendment.
3. This order will govern the disposal of W.P. Nos. 4824/2017, 4827/2017, 4828/2017, 4829/2017, 4830/2017 and 4834/2017 since it is submitted by the counsel for the petitioner that all these writ petitions involve the same issue in identical facts situation.
4. For convenience facts have been noted from W.P. No. 4824/2017.
5. By these writ petitions, the petitioner-Hope Textitles Ltd. has challenged the order of the Controlling Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act dated 24.10.2013 and the appellate order dated 23.5.2017.
6. Brief facts are that respondent was an employee of the petitioner-company and had retired from service on reaching the age of superannuation on 28.2.2002. He had filed an application under section 7(1) of the Payment of Gratuity Act before the controlling authority and reply was submitted by the petitioner and the controlling authority after permitting the parties to lead evidence had passed the order dated 4.1.2012. Thereafter on an application for review filed by the petitioner, the order was partly reviewed vide order dated 24.10.2013. Petitioner had preferred an Appeal against this order and the appellate authority vide order dated 23.5.2017 has dismissed the Appeal.
7. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the amended section 2A of the Payment of Gratuity Act will not apply because the said section has no retrospective application. He further submits that authorities have committed an error in determining the last drawn salary of the respondent.
8. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record.
9. In the identical writ petition being W.P. No. 3720/2011(S) (Hope Textitles Ltd. v. Nemichand) filed by the petitioner against the similar order, the issue relating to applicability of section 2A of Payment of Gratuity Act has been considered and it has been held that amended section 2A will apply.
10. This Court in the case of Nemichand (supra) has held as under :-
“7. The Section 2(c) of the Act has been amended and Section 2A has been inserted by the Act No.26 of 1984 with effect from 11.2.1981. The amended Section 2(c) and Section 2A read as under :-
“2. Definitions.-In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires.-
(a) *****************************
(b) *****************************
(c) “continuous service” means continuous service as defined in section 2A;
2A. Continuous service.- For the purpose of this Act.-
1. an employee shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he has, for that period, been in uninterrupted service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness, accident, leave, absence from duty without leave (not being absence in respect of which an order treating the absence as break in service has been passed in accordance with the standing orders, rules or regulations governing the employees of the establishment), lay-off, strike or a lock-out or cessation of work not due to any fault of the employee, whether such uninterrupted or interrupted service was rendered before or after the commencement of this Act;
2. where an employee (not being an employee employed in a seasonal establishment) is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1), for any period of one year or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under the employer-
(a) for the said period of one year, if the employee during the period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less th
