ORDER

Mishra J. -- 1. With the Consent of the parties, the matter is finally heard.

2. The present petition is being filed being aggrieved by the order dated 15.9.2016 passed by the respondents whereby the representation submitted by the petitioner has been rejected.

3. It is alleged by the counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order is total disregard to the order passed by the Court vide order dated 1.9.2016 passed in W.P. No. 3719/2014 (S) and the petitioner has been declared to be ineligible for recruitment in the police department. It is submitted that the inaction on part of the respondent No. 4 is not only arbitrary and malafide and appears to be an outcome of malafide but also contents in nature as he was well aware of passing of the order passed by this Court dated 1.9.2016 and despite of the fact that the Hon’ble High Court has categorically recorded the finding with respect to the fact that no offence containing in moral turpitude is made out against the petitioner has directed the authorities to reconsider the case of the petitioner for grant of appointment then also the respondent No.4 has rejected the representation of the petitioner holding that the offence under sections 452 and 323 of IPC are the offences falling under the definition of moral turpitude and are not offences of simple category. Therefore, on the recommendation of the committee the representation has been rejected. Learned counsel for the petitioner has stated that the petitioner has been acquitted of all the charges in the criminal case vide judgment of acquittal dated 12.7.2012. He has further drawn attention of this Court to the order dated 1.9.2016 passed in W.P. No. 3719/2014 (S) and has argued that the Hon’ble High Court has considered the aforesaid aspect in the case of Ravindra Kumar Pandoria v. State of M.P. & Others, and has held as under :

“15. Pertinently one of the offences mentioned in the impugned order is under section 326 of I.P.C. which appears to be grave. The judgment of acquittal does not indicate that the injured sustained any grievous injury as defined in section 320 of IPC.. Thus, at best even if the offence is treated as proved, which in fact was not the case, the petitioner could be held guilty for an offfence under section 323 of IPC., of voluntarily causing minor hurt without any weapon as admittedly no recovery of any offending weapon was made from the petitioner. Causing of Minor hurt, in the considered opinion of this Court, does not involve more turpitude as there is no depravity of character involved.

16. As regards offence of house trespass under section 452 of IPC, the same was not found to be proved at all and it appears from the judgment of the trial Court that petitioner was acquitted honourably without even on iota of implicative evidence and therefore acquittal recorded on the ground of benefit of doubt in the judgment by the trial Court is a misnomer. This Court thus leaves the matter for the employer to be decided on the principles enunciated above after considering candidature of the petitioner afresh in terms of the directions passed below.

17. Accordingly, the present petition is allowed with following directions :-

(i) The impugned order dated 15.5.2014 contained in Annexure- P/1 is set aside. (ii) The employer of respondent No.4 shall reconsider candidature of the petitioner for appointment to the post of constable after taking into account the principles laid down in the case of Avtar Singh (supra), as well as the observations made by this Court and pass a speaking order as early as possible within period of 60 working days from the date of communication of the order of this Court passed today. No cost.”

4. It is stated that despite the specific finding being recorded by this Court in the earlier round of litigation that the petitioner has been acquitted and no offence of moral turpitude is made out against the petitioner then also the impugned order has been passed holding that the petition