The main legal point established in the judgment is that the effect of prosecution sanction becomes immaterial once the investigation is completed and charge sheet filed, and a mere error in sanction is not fatal unless it results in a failure of justice.

ORDER :

Rajeev Kumar Shrivastava, J.

1. y this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has assailed the order dated 3.10.2016, whereby the respondent No. 3, i.e., Deputy Secretary (Personnel), General Administration Department, Mantralaya, Govt. of MP, Vallabh Bhawan, Bhopal (MP), has granted sanction to prosecute the petitioner under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for brevity, the 'PC Act') and Sections 420, 471, 120-B of Indian Penal Code.

2. The facts of the case in short are that the petitioner is an employee of the State Administrative Service and presently attached at Divisional Headquarter Narmadapuram, Hoshangabad, District Hoshangabad. In the year 2004 the petitioner was posted on deputation as Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Gwalior w.e.f. 23.3.2004 and he worked for approximately eight months up to 27.11.2004. One Sudhir Singh Sengar filed a complaint to Lokayukt. The said complaint was bogus and was filed by committing fraud, cheating and misusing the name of Sudhir Singh Sengar and by making forged signature of Sudhir Singh Sengar. When this fact came to the knowledge of actual Sudhir Singh Sengar, he filed specific affidavit in the Office of Lokayukta denying to have made any complaint and submitted that forgery is played using his name by some mischievous persons. He also demanded action against those mischievous persons. Ignoring the affidavit filed by Sudhir Singh Sengar, the Lokayukta registered Crime No. 21/2009 under Section 13(1)(d), 13(2) of PC Act and Section 120-B of IPC. After filing of affidavit by Sudhir Singh Sengar, Lokayukta failed to identify the person who made the complaint. Thereafter, Sudhir Singh Sengar approached this Court and filed one application under Section 482 of CrPC, which was allowed on 23.1.2015 and this Court directed the Lokayukta to conduct enquiry and take action against the person concerned. The Lokayukta enquired the matter and registered Crime No. 382/2016.

3. It is further submitted that in between, by various orders this Court directed the General Administration Department through its Principal Secretary/Additional Chief Secretary for considering pending representation of the petitioner. Despite aforesaid, the parent department of the petitioner granted sanction which is faulty as it was contrary to the legal position. The said sanction was tainted, malafide and prejudiced. There was no prima facie evidence against the petitioner. No prior intimation was given to the parent department. The case was registered with malafide intention. Due to aforesaid pendency of the case, the present petitioner has lost opportunity of due promotion. Hence, the petitioner has filed the instant writ petition.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned order passed by the respondent-authority is per se illegal, arbitrary and malafide and is totally without application of mind. The order is unsustainable, hence deserves to be quashed. The respondents have failed to comply the directions given by this Court in its true spirit and sense. While granting the prosecution sanction the respondent-authority has failed to consider the consequential report submitted by Lokayukta on 10.2.2015. Originally the petitioner was on deputation in Urban Administration Department. The borrowing department has denied the prosecution sanction as no offence is made out, despite the sanction granted is illegal. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on para 12 of the judgment in the case of Vinod Chandra Semwal vs. Special Police Establishment, Ujjain [(2015) 8 SCC 383], wherein it is observed as under:-

"12. In the present case what we find is that the delegatee K.K. Singh Chauhan executed the exchange-deed dated 23.12.1993 on behalf of the Chairman. There is nothing on record to suggest that it was executed at the instance of the appellant. By Office Order dated 22.