ORDER

1. Heard on admission.

2. This petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenges the charge sheet dated 16.2.2023 (Annexure-P/1). Petitioner has already filed reply to the said charge sheet.

3. Criticising the charge sheet, learned counsel for the petitioner raised following submissions :-

(i) a preliminary/fact finding enquiry was conducted by the Department in which charges were not found proved against the petitioner, and therefore, issuance of charge sheet is bad in law in the light of judgment of Supreme Court in Nand Kumar Verma v. State of Jharkhand, (2012) 3 SCC 580.

(ii) Charges are vague and ambiguous.

(iii) the other persons also committed misconduct but petitioner alone is picked up and chosen for disciplinary action which is discriminatory in nature.

(iv) the documents listed alongwith the charge sheet are not supplied to the petitioner enabling the petitioner to file the effective reply.

4. Shri Ankit Agrawal, learned Government Advocate opposed the admission.

5. No other point is pressed by the learned counsel for the parties.

6. This is trite that scope of interference at the stage of issuance of charge sheet in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution is limited. The charge sheet is not an order. If allegations mentioned in the charge sheet are admitted in totality and yet no misconduct is made out, interference can be made. Interference can also be made if it is issued by an incompetent authority, if it is highly belated and there exists no justifiable explanation of delay. In the case of Union of India v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, (2006) 12 SCC 28, the apex Court opined as under :

“13. It is well settled by a series of decisions of this Court that ordinarily no writ lies against a chargesheet or show-cause notice vide Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board v. Ramesh Kumar Singh [(1996) 1 SCC 327 : JT (1995) 8 SC 331] , Special Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse [(2004) 3 SCC 440 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 826 : AIR 2004 SC 1467], Ulagappa v. Divisional Commr., Mysore [(2001) 10 SCC 639] , State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma [(1987) 2 SCC 179 : (1987) 3 ATC 319 : AIR 1987 SC 943] , etc.

14. The reason why ordinarily a writ petition should not be entertained against a mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet is that at that stage the writ petition may be held to be premature. A mere charge-sheet or show-cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order which affects the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. It is quite possible that after considering the reply to the show-cause notice or after holding an enquiry the authority concerned may drop the proceedings and/or hold that the charges are not established. It is well settled that a writ petition lies when some right of any party is infringed. A mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet does not infringe the right of anyone. It is only when a final order imposing some punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, that the said party can be said to have any grievance.

15. Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and hence such discretion under Article 226 should not ordinarily be exercised by quashing a show-cause notice or charge-sheet.

16. No doubt, in some very rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash a charge-sheet or show-cause notice if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is wholly illegal. However, ordinarily the High Court should not interfere in such a matter.

17. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the charge against the respondent had already been enquired into earlier and he had been exonerated of the charge in an earlier proceeding. Hence, he contended that the impugned charge memo would amount to double jeopardy and was therefore illegal. He relied upon the decision of this Court in Lt. Governor, Delhi v. HC Nar