The main legal point established in the judgment is that parties involved in a compromise under Order 23 Rule 3 of CPC are entitled to a refund of Court Fees under Section 89 of the CPC and Section 16 of the Court Fees Act.

JUDGMENT

Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari, J. - Heard on the question of admission.

2. In this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have assailed the legality, propriety and validity of the order dated 21/12/2022, passed in Civil Suit No.1100001/16 by the First Additional District Judge, Neemuch(M.P.) whereby though the joint application filed by the petitioners/plaintiffs and the respondents for compromise between the parties under Order 23 Rule 3 has been allowed, but the learned trial Court has refused to refund the Court Fees.

3. The facts of the case are not necessary for the purpose of deciding the issue of refund of Court Fees.

4. Admittedly, the trial Court has allowed the application under Order 23 Rule 3 of CPC, however, has refused to refund the Court Fees on the ground that the petitioners were negligent in filing the documents and the matter was fixed for evidence and, therefore, the case for refund of Court Fees does not fall within the meaning of Section 89 of the CPC.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that as per Section 89 of the CPC, the Court is required to formulate the terms of settlement in respect of the dispute, which the Court has readily accepted. The case of the parties fall under Section 89(1)(c) of the CPC. As per Section 16 of the Court Fees Act, 1870, it states that "where the Court refers the parties to the suit to any one of the mode of settlement of dispute referred to in Section 89 of CPC, the plaintiff shall be entitled for a certificate from the Court authorizing him to receive back from the Collector, the full amount of the fee paid in respect of such plaint. In view of the aforesaid, the petitioners are entitled for refund of Court Fees.

6. Since both the parties have entered into compromise and the compromise having been allowed by the trial Court, no notice to the respondents is necessary. On perusal of the order of the trial Court, the reasoning assigned for refusing refund of Court Fees is not justified. From Section 89 of the CPC and Section 16 of the Court Fees Act, it is very clear that in case of the settlement, the petitioners/plaintiffs are eligible for refund of the Court Fees.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of High Court of Judicature at Madras represented by its Registrar General Vs. M.C. Subramaniam and others reported in AIR 2021 Supreme Court(SC) 2662 in which it is held that the participants in such settlements will be entitled for the same benefits as those who have been referred to explore alternate disputes settlement methods under Section 89 of the CPC. Section 89 of the CPC and Section 69A of the 1955 Act has to be interpreted liberally. All methods of out of Court dispute settlement between the parties that the Court subsequently finds to have been legally arrived at are eligible for refund of Court fees.

8. Learned counsel for the petitioners also pointed out a decision of Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Kesarimal and Another Vs. Dhanraj and Others reported in 2010 (3) MPWN 54 in which it is held that the petitioner is eligible for refund of Court Fees in the light of Section 89 of CPC read with Section 16 of the Court Fees Act.

9. Accordingly, the order impugned dated 21/12/2022(Annexure-P/1) passed in Civil Suit No.1100001/2016 by the First Additional District Judge, Neemuch so far as it relates to non-refund of Court Fees is, hereby, quashed. The other part of the order i.e., "Compromise" shall remain intact.

10. As a result thereof, in exercise of powers under Section 89 of CPC read with Section 16 of the Court Fees Act, the Court Fees paid by the petitioners/plaintiffs in the present suit shall be refunded as per the procedure contained in Section 16 of the Court Fees Act.

11. The petition stands allowed to the extent as indicated hereinabove.