1. With consent of learned counsel for the parties, the matter is finally heard.

2. Petitioner seeks writ of quo warranto against respondent No.5 that being convicted for an offence under sections 307, 323, 436, 435 and 148 read with section 149 of IPC he was not eligible to contest the election of Member, Ward No.16, Janpad Panchayat Berasia, and having been elected he has no right to hold public office of President, Janpad Panchayat.

3. Briefly stated the relevant facts are that on 22.2.2015 election of member, Janpad Panchayat, Ward No.16 was held wherein the petitioner and respondent No.5 contested the election with 2119 votes. Later on, the petitioner came to know that the respondent No.5 was tried for an offence under sections 307, 323, 436, 435 and 148 read with section 149 of IPC. That by a judgment dated 16.6.2005 passed by the Ninth Additional Sessions Judge, Bhopal in Sessions Trial No.114/2002 he was convicted and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for six moths for offence under section 148, five years for the offence under section 307/149 with fine of Rs.1,000/-, six months under section 323/149, two years under section 435/149 and fine of Rs.500/-. These sentences were to run concurrently. The judgment recording conviction has been challenged vide Criminal Appeal No.1218/2005 wherein the jail sentence is suspended vide order dated 16.8.2005.

4. Section 36(1)(a)(ii) of Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Raj Evam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993 which entails disqualification is in the following terms:

“36. Disqualification for being office-bearer of Panchayat. -- (1) No person shall be eligible to be an office-bearer of Panchayat who.--

(a) has, either before or after the commencement of this Act, been convicted. --

(i) of an offence under the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 (No.22 of 1955) or under any law in connection with the use, consumption or sale of narcotics or any law corresponding thereto in force in any part of the State, unless a period of five years or such lesser period as the State Government may allow in any particular case has elapsed since his conviction; or

(ii) of any other offence and had been sentenced to imprisonment for not less than six months, unless a period of five years or such less period as the State Government may allow in any particular case has elapsed since his release; or

...”

5. The question is whether the term “release” means a person discharged and released, or released having undergone the entire term or released on bail.

6. The object for introduction of the provisions like section 36 in the statute is with an object to keep the tainted person away from body politic.

7. In New India Assurance Co.Ltd. v. Nusli Neville Wadia [(2008)3 SCC 279], it has been observed by their Lordships :

“51. Except in the first category of cases, as has been noticed by us hereinbefore, sections 4 and 5 of the Act, in our opinion, may have to be construed differently in view of the decisions rendered by this Court. If the landlord being a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India is required to prove fairness and reasonableness on its part in initiating a proceeding, it is for it to show how its prayer meets the constitutional requirements of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. For proper interpretation not only the basic principles of natural justice have to be borne in mind, but also principles of constitutionalism involved therein. With a view to read the provisions of the Act in a proper and effective manner, we are of the opinion that literal interpretation, if given, may give rise to an anomaly or absurdity which must be avoided. So as to enable a superior Court to interpret a statute in a reasonable manner, the Court must place itself in the chair of a reasonable legislator/author. So done, the rules of purposive construction have to be resorted to which would require the construction of the Act in such a manner so as to see that the object of the Act fulfiled; whi