1997 Supreme(MP) 874

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
S.B. SAKRIKAR, J.
Munnalal - Applicant
Versus
Kailash Chandra - Non-Applicant
C. Revn. No. 255 of 1997 (I)
Decided On : 29-07-1997

Headnote:(1) Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (M.P.) – – S. 23 – E – – revision under – – powers are wider than under S. 115 CPC – – even this width does not entitle to enter into merits of factual controversies.

       (2) Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (M.P.) – – S. 2 (b) and (i) – – 'landlord' and 'tenant' – – purchaser of house – – becomes 'landlord' – – person residing therein becomes 'tenant'.

       (3) Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (M.P.) – – S. 23 – A – – relationship of landlord and tenant denied – – Rent Controlling Authority has still jurisdiction to entertain and decide the application for eviction.

       (4) Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (M.P.) – – S. 23 – J – – retired employee of State Undertaking and widow – – both are 'landlord' under this provision.

       (5) Words and Phrases – – word 'company' – – includes corporation created under special statute which is owned or controlled by controlled or State Government.

       (6) Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (M.P.) – – S. 23A (a) – – bona fide 'need' proved by holder of power of attorney by landlord – – no rebuttal evidence adduced – – 'bonafide need' rightly held established.

        Short Note

       1. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that initially deceased Kailashchandra, Smt. Pushpabai w/o Kailash Agrawal and non – applicant No.3 Smt. Saroj and non – applicant No.4 Ashok Kumar filed the application before the RCA Indore under Section 23A of the Act on the ground that the landlord required the suit – accommodation consisting of two rooms of house bearing No. 33/3 situated in Jethmal Ki Chal, Murai Mohalla, Sanyogita Ganj, Indore against the applicant. The applicant, after obtaining leave to defend, in terms of Section 26 (3) of the Act, filed reply and resisted the application. During the pendency of the application before the RCA, original applicant Smt. Pushpabai had expired and in her place Non – applicant No. 2A Manish Kumar and 2B Pawan Kumar are substituted as Legal Representatives of the deceased. During pendency of the litigation, original applicant, Kailashchandra S/o Onkarlal also expired and in his place, names of Legal Representative of the deceased are substituted.

       2. On the basis of the evidence on record and evaluation of the evidence, the RCA found that the need of the landlord with regard to the suit – accommodation is established and passed the order of eviction against the applicant as stated above. Aggrieved, the applicant has filed this revision petition under Section 23E of the Act.

       Held: I have carefully considered rival submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record as also cases cited by the parties. In Dayaram's case 1994 (1) MPJR 148, this Court has considered the scope of Section 23E of the Act and has held that power available to this Court under Section 23E of the Act is wider than one conferred under Section 115 of the CPC but narrower that the power of appeal, yet even this width does not entitle this Court to enter into merits of the factual controversies between the parties and to reverse the findings of fact in this regard. For taking aforesaid view, reliance was placed on the decision of the Apex Court reported in 1988 (2) SCC 172; Heeralal Kapoor v. Prabhu Choudhari and Division Bench of this Court reported in 1985 JLJ 793; B. Johnson v. C.S. Naidu.

       3. In view of the aforesaid position of law and on examining the case on hand, I find that RCA relied on unrebutted testimony of the applicant's witness, Ajay Patni and on the basis of facts stated in the sale – deed copy of which is Exh. P/2 – c and also notice, Exh. P/10, has rightly held that as the suit – house was purchased by the original applicants, Kailashchandra, Smt. Pushpa, Smt. Saroj and Ashok, they became landlords for the suit – house and the present applicant being in occupation of the two rooms of the suit – house became tenant of the aforesaid landlords. It is contended on behalf of the applicant that when the relationship of landlord and tenant is denied, the RCA has no jurisdiction to entertain the application filed under S. 23A of the Act and pass the order on the same. This contention of the learned counsel cannot be accepted in view of the law laid down in Krishna Prakash's case 1986 MPRCJ 34 in which this Court – has held that if tenant denies relationship of landlord and tenant in his reply, then mere denial will not debar the jurisdiction of the RCA to entertain the application under Section 23A of the Act. It was, further held that if jurisdiction of RCA is held to be ousted only on the ground of denying the relationship of landlord and tenant, it will not be possible for the Rent Controller to decide any application for ejectment. Every tenant unwilling to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller, shall then come forward with such a plea of non – existence of relationship of landlord and tenant. In the light of the decision of this Court, I do not find that Rent Controlling Authority has committed any error in holding that relationship of landlord and tenant is existing between the parties. With regard to second objection raised on behalf of the applicant that from the evidence on record it is not proved that anyone of the landlord falls under the definition of the 'landlord' defined under section 23 j of the Act. In this respect it is not disputed that original applicants deceased Kailashchandra was retd. employee of M/s. Malwa Mills, an undertaking of NTC, established under a statute owned and controlled by the State Government. Similarly, from the statement of the applicant's witness, Ajay Patni, it is also proved that other two landladies Smt. Pushpadevi (deceased) was a widow and Smt. Saroj, a divorcee, undoubtedly, the aforesaid original landlord and landladies fall under the category of' landlord' specified in Section 23 J of the Act. For the aforesaid finding, reliance is placed on the decision of the Apex Court reported in 1995 JLJ 460; Surindra Verma v. Ranjeet Narayan Haskar. The Apex Court has held that under Section 23J (ii) of the Act ‘word company’ includes Corporation created under the Special Statute, which is owned or controlled by Central or State Government. As such the objection of the applicant that any of the landlords of the case on hand, do not fall under the category of landlord as specified under Section 23 J of the Act falls on the ground.

       4. On the point of bona fide requirement of the suit – accommodation there is a statement of only witness Ajay Patni, a witness for the non – applicant/landlord. It is pertinent to note that there is no evidence on record to rebut the facts stated by Ajay Patni in his statement recorded on oath. The defence of the present applicant was closed by the orders of the RCA passed under Section 13 (6) of the Act as the applicant failed to comply with the provisions of Section 13 of the Act. It is also apparent that it is subsequent stage of the case the applicant did not remain present before the RCA and proceeded ex – parte. In the circumstances, the RCA has committed no error in placing reliance on the uncrossed and unrebutted testimony of non – applicant's witness Ajay Patni and in holding that the suit – house is required bonafied by the landlords for their residence and for the residence of their family members. It is true that no landlord appeared in the witness box to prove the alleged need of the suit – accommodation but as stated by Ajay Patni in his statement that because of old age and disability of the original landlord Kailash Chandra (deceased) he is appearing in the witness – box on the power of attorney given by said Kailashchandra. He also stated that he is well aware of the facts of case and on the instructions of the landlord he recorded his statements.

       5. In the aforesaid circumstances, it cannot be said that as no landlord appeared in the witness – box, the bonafide requirement of the suit accommodation is not proved.

       6. As a result of the foregoing discussions, I do not find any reason to dislodge or demolish the finding and the order of eviction passed by the RCA against the applicant with regard to the suit – accommodation. Revision dismissed.