Narain vs Basant Rao - 1989 Supreme(MP) 537

Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation

Advocates Appeared:
For the Petitioner: Ramji Sharma
For the Non-Petitioner: D.K. Kothari

Headnote:Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (M.P.) – – . S. 23 – A, 23 – E and 23 – J – – eviction order passed by R.C.A. – landlord of special category dying during pendency of revision under S. 23 – E – – no illegality, impropriety or incorrectness committed by R.C.A. – – order not liable to be set aside.
        Short Note
       1. The leading authority on the effect of landlord’s death in ejectment proceedings is to be found in Smt. Phool Rani and others v. Sh. Naubat Rai Ahluwalia (AIR 1973 SC 2110). Their Lordships observed vide paras 9 and 10;
       "It is patent and would be a truism to say that the death of the plaintiff will not cause the ejectment proceedings to abate if the right to sue survives."
       xxx xxx xxx
       "The solution to the problem whether the appellants can continue the proceedings in their capacity as the legal. representatives of the plaintiff lies in the pleadings of the plaintiff for those alone can reveal the true nature of. the right asserted by the plaintiff in the ejectment proceedings."
       2. vide para 13, their Lordships before noticing several decided cases, categorised several situations arising on account of death of the landlord pendente lite into three. The first one" relevant to our purpose, is as under:
       "cases in which the death of the plaintiff occurred after a decree for possession was passed in his favour, say, during the pendency of an appeal filed by the unsuccessful tenant."
       3. As to this category vide para 14 their Lordships observed:
       ".... the estate is entitled to the benefit which, under a decree, has accrued in favour of the plaintiff and therefore the legal representatives axe entitled to defend further proceedings, like an appeal, which constitute a challenge to the benefit."
       4. Vide paras 15 and 16, their Lordships approved three views taken in 3 decisions cited before them from the High Courts of Madhya Pradesh, Delhi and Punjab. In Motilal v. Kailash Narain (AIR 1960 MP 134) the landlord having obtained a decree for possession on the ground of personal necessity under section 4(g) of Madhya Bharat Accommodation Control Act, 1955 expired during pendency of the appeal filed by the tenant. The decree was held to be enuring for the benefit of son and Widow of the deceased landlord. So were the cases in the Punjab and Delhi decisions.
       5. Motilal's case (supra) was followed in Narsinghdas v. Mohd. Yasin Khan (1962 MPLJ – SN 93) wherein it was held that words in section 4(g) of the Act were to be interpreted liberally to cover the need of the landlord and his dependents. It was further held that when need of the widow and. brother of the landlord was specifically referred to at the stage of the trial, it could be enquired into even after the death of the• landlord during continuance of proceedings.
       6. In view of the overwhelming authorities referred to hereinabove, there can be no manner of doubt that if by reference to the nature of the requirement pleaded, the cause of action survives to the legal representatives in spite of the death of plaintiff/landlord, the ejectment proceedings can be continued. So also if the death of the plaintiff occurs after a decree for possession was passed in his favour, the legal representatives can defend the decree as their accrued estate in further proceedings prosecuted by an unsuccessful tenant.
       7. Applying the above said test to the present case there is no manner of doubt that the requirement pleaded and found proved by the Authority below was of not only Ansuiyabai but also of her son who is one of the legal representatives now defending in revision the order of eviction under challenge. The death of Smt. Ansuiyabai, the original plaintiff, would not, therefore, render the order of eviction liable to be set aside.
       8. Faced with this situation dauntless Shri Sharma still submits that the jurisdiction under Chapter III – A of the Act is a special jurisdiction conferred on the Rent Controlling Authority by virtue of the landlord initiating and prosecuting proceedings to be one. belonging to a special category contemplated by section 23 – J of the Act and the death of that landlord would deprive the Rent Controlling Authority of its jurisdiction unless the legal representatives brought on record or at least one of them belonged to 23 – J category. The argument, though attractive, betrays fallacy no sooner it is demonstrated that disqualification as to jurisdiction. could be attracted to the Rent Controlling Authority and not to this Court hearing revision. This is where the character of the revisional jurisdiction assumes significance. In spite of a little wider jurisdiction conferred by section 23 – E of the Act, the jurisdiction would nevertheless remain a revisional jurisdiction entitling this Court to make a probe into the legality, propriety or correctness of the order passed by the Authority below or as to the regularity of the proceedings threat, unlike an appellate jurisdiction where the entire matter becomes at large before the appellate Court and mere filing of appeal destroys the finality attaching with the judgment and decree impugned. Smt. Ansuiyabai was certainly. alive on. the date of passing of the order of eviction by the Authority below. The question to be asked by this Court to itself would be: Is there any illegality,. impropriety or incorrectness in the order passed by the Authority below? Is there any irregularity in the proceedings of the Authority below? Needless to say that in the facts of the case, the answer would be 'No'. That would be an end of the matter. The order of the authority below is to be maintained because it was a valid order passed in valid proceedings. The death of the plaintiff cannot abate the proceedings because the cause of action does survive to the legal representatives on the pleadings in the case. AIR 1973 SC 2110 followed. AIR 1960 MP 134 and 1962 MPLJ – SN 93 relied on. Revision dismissed.