Yadav, J.--1. This order shall govern the final disposal of Writ Appea l16/2013 and Writ Appea 36/2013.

2. Both these appeals under section 2(1) of Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nayalaya (Khand Nyayapeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 are directed against the order dated 30.10.2012 passed in Writ Petition No. 4654/2007(s).

3. That Writ Appeal No. 16/2013 is at the instance of the State of Madhya Pradesh and its functionaries; whereas, Writ Appeal No. 36/2013 is by the employee.

4. The writ petition at the instance of employee, employed as Constable (Trade Man) in Special Armed Force was directed against the removal order, as the employee was found guilty of the charges of having accepted Rs.1,20,000/- from one Arvind Singh Jatav s/o Late Panchu Jatav for the purpose of securing his job in the SAF. The appeal and revision against the said order were also dismissed on 15.2.2007 and 11.6.2007, which were also challenged in the writ petition.

5. Learned Single Judge on a finding that the alleged transaction was of 20.11.2001 whereas the complaint was lodged by the complainant on 4.6.2005 with no cogent explanation as to the delay, except that despite repeated demand the amount was not returned, further found that except oral testimony of the complainant with no corroboration with substantial material, faulted with the findings of the enquiry officer being perverse. Learned Single Judge observed “Apart from the oral evidence, there is no other evidence to support the misconduct. The oral evidence has to be considered after taking other surrounding facts.”

6. It is held in “Union of India v. H.C. Goel [AIR 1964 SC 364]” that :

“23. That takes us to the merits of the respondent's contention that the conclusion of the appellant that the third charge framed against the respondent had been proved, is based on no evidence. The learned Attorney General has stressed before us that in dealing with this question, we ought to bear in mind the fact that the appellant is acting with the determination to root out corruption, and so, if it is shown that the view taken by the appellant is a reasonably possible view this Court should not sit in appeal over that decision and seek to decide whether this Court would have taken the same view or not. This contention is no doubt absolutely sound. The only test which we can legitimately apply in dealing with this part of the respondent's case is, is there any evidence on which a finding can be made against the respondent that charge No. 3 was proved against him. In exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 226 on such a plea, the High Court cannot consider the question about the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a particular conclusion. That is a matter which is within the competence of the authority which deals with the question; but the High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the charge in question is proved against the respondent? This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence illegally the impugned conclusion follows or not. Applying this test, we are inclined to hold that the respondent's grievance is well founded because, in our opinion, the finding which is implicit in the appellant's order dismissing the respondent that charge number 3 is proved against him is based on no evidence.”

7. Thus, even if the argument led on behalf of the State is accepted that the scope of judicial review is very limited in a writ petition yet in a case where the findings are apparently perverse or not supported by cogent material evidence, it will be within the competence of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to interfere with such finding.

8. In the case at hand, evidently, the charge against the petitioner has been that in the year 2001