1. Supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is invoked to assail the interlocutory order dated 7.3.2005 passed by the Court below in Civil Suit No. 61-A/2014 whereby an application under O.1 rule 10 CPC preferred by the plaintiff/petitioner herein has suffered dismissal at the hands of the trial Court by relying upon the decision of the apex Court in Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy reported in AIR 2007 SC 1332 by holding that pendente lite purchaser was a necessary party in the suit for specific performance.

2. The learned counsel for the petitioner are heard on the question of admission.

3. Without entering into the prolixity of the argument extended by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the factual matrix involved, this Court is of the view that the issue involved herein is no more res integrain view of the subsequent decision of the apex Court in A. Nawab John and others v. V.N. Subramaniyam, reported in (2012) 7 SCC 738. The relevant portion of which is reproduced below for ready reference and convenience Para (15 to 22) :

15. The first preliminary objection is that the 2nd defendant, being a pendente lite purchaser, has no locus standi to question the correctness of the decision of the Trial Court to condone the delay in representation of the plaint. To understand the legal rights and obligations of a pendente lite purchaser, it is necessary to examine the jurisprudential background of the doctrine of lis pendens and its statutory expression.

16. This Court in Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayyaswami and Others, (1972) 2 SCC 200 (paras 42 to 44) quoted with approval a passage from the Commentaries on the Laws of Scotland, by Bell, which explains the doctrine of lis pendens :

“43. ………….. Bell, in his commentaries on the Laws of Scotland, said that it was grounded on the maxim : “Pendent elite nibil innovandum”. He observed :

“It is a general rule which seems to have been recognised in all regular systems of jurisprudence, that during the pendence of an action, of which the object is to vest the property or obtain the possession of real estate, a purchaser shall be held to take that estate as it stands in the person of the seller, and to be bound by the claims which shall ultimately be pronounced.'”(Emphasis supplied)

17. section 52of the Transfer of Property Act, (for short “the T.P.Act”) incorporates doctrine of lis pendens and it stipulates that during the pendency of any suit or proceeding in which any right to immovable property is, directly or specifically, in question, the property, which is the subject matter of such suit or proceeding cannot be “transferred or otherwise dealt with”, so as to affect the rights of any other party to such a suit or proceeding. The section is based on the principle :

“………..that it would plainly be impossible that any action or suit could be brought to a successful termination, if alienations pendente lite were permitted to prevail. The plaintiff would be liable in every case to be defeated by the defendant’s alienating before the judgment or decree, and would be driven to commence his proceedings de novo, subject to be defeated by the some course of proceeding.”

Quoted with approval by this Court in Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj.

18. It is settled legal position that the effect of section 52 is not to render transfers affected during the pendency of a suit by a party to the suit void; but only to render such transfers subservient to the rights of the parties to such suit, as may be, eventually, determined in the suit. In other words, the transfer remains valid subject, of course, to the result of the suit. The pendente lite purchaser would be entitled to or suffer the same legal rights and obligations of his vendor as may be eventually determined by the Court.

“12...........The mere pendency of a suit does not prevent one of the parties from dealing with the property constituting the subjectmatter of the suit. The section only postulates a c