The main legal point established in the judgment is the power of the High Court to quash criminal proceedings in cases of settlement between the parties, especially in matrimonial disputes, as guided by the provisions of IPC sections 498-A, 323, 506-II and CrPC 320(2) and the decisions of the Apex Court.

JUDGMENT :

1. Shri A. Upadhyaya, learned counsel for the applicant. Shri Devendra Singh, learned Panel Lawyer for the non-applicant No. 1/State. Shri Sunil Yadav, learned counsel for the non-applicant No. 2. Heard. The non-applicant No. 2 who is legally married wife of applicant lodged a FIR against her husband registered at Crime No. 56/2011.

2. After investigation charge-sheet was filed against the applicant under sections 498-A, 323 and 506-II of the Indian Penal Code

3. During pendency of the criminal proceeding, the matter has been amicably settled between the parties and, therefore, an application for compounding under section 320(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code was filed.

4. The learned Judicial Magistrate First Glass, Indore allowed the application partly on 13-2-2014 and compounded the offence under sections 323 and 506-II of the Indian Penal Code and rejected the application in respect of an offence under section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code.

5. Learned counsel for the applicant made a statement at bar that dispute has been settled between the parties and in view of the settlement arrived at between the parties they have also filed the application for compromise before the Appellate Court. The application of compromise is supported by the affidavit of the parties. The complainant and the applicant at some point earlier married to each other. As of now a compromise has been effected between the parties. In the totality of the circumstances, I am of the view that settlement had arrived between the parties is sensible step that will benefit the parties, give quietus to the controversy and rehabilitate and normalize the relationship between them.

6. Learned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance on the decision of Apex Court in the matter of Jitendra Raghuvanshi and others vs. Babita Raghuvanshi and another, reported in 2013(2) SCC (Cri.) 302 and has held that,

Even, in non-compoundable offences pertaining to matrimonial disputes, if Court is satisfied that parties have settled the disputes amicably and without any pressure, then for purpose of securing ends of justice, FIR or complaint or subsequent criminal proceedings in respect of said offences, held, can be quashed under section 482 of the Code.

7. Learned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of B. S. Joshi and ors. vs. State of Haryana and anr., reported as AIR 2003 SC 1386 (1) and Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and anr., reported as 2012 Cri.L.J. 4934. Para 7 of the judgment in the case of B. S. Joshi and ors. vs. State of Haryana is relevant which reads as under :—

7. The High Court has relied upon Madhu Limaye’s case for coming to the conclusion that since the offence under sections 498-A and 406, Indian Penal Code are non-compoundable, it would be impermissible in law to quash the FIR on the ground that there has been a settlement between the parties. The decision in Madhy Limaye’s case, has been misread and misapplied by the High Court, The question considered in that case was when there was a bar on the power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in an appeal, enquiry, trial or other proceedings, what would be its effect on exercise of power under section 482 of the Code. Sub-section (2) of section 397 of Criminal Procedure Code providing that the power of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceedings was noticed and it was held, that on a plain reading of section 482, it would follow that nothing in the Code, which would include sub-section (2) of section 397 also, “shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court”. The Court said that if we were to say that the said bar is not to operate in the exercise of the inherent power at all, it will be setting at naught one of the limitations imposed upon the exercise of the revisional powers but ad