1981 Supreme(MP) 708

Faizan Uddin. J.
Johan Ram v. Dasmat Bai
C. R. No. 734 of 1981 (J); Decided on 14-12-1981.

Headnote:(1) Court fees Act, 1870 -- S. 7 (IV) (c) -- plaintiff party to sale deed alleging obtaining his signatures by fraud. misrepresentation by misleading him -- even if relief for setting aside sale deed asked for, in substance the relief is for declaration -- plaintiff cannot be regarded to be the party of such deed -- Court fees for declaration sufficient.

        (2) Suits valuation Act. 1887 -- S. 8 -- suit for declaration -- plaintiff is al liberty to put his own valuation-question of jurisdiction and Court fees are to be determined from the essence of plaint allegations.

        The defendant raised an objection regarding the jurisdiction of the trial Court by contending that the plaintiff was a party to the said document dated 11-6-1979 which is for a consideration of Rs. 12,000/-, and therefore, the suit should have been valued accordingly, and if it is so valued, the trial Court will have no juri5dction to entertain and try the suit whose jurisdiction was limited to Rs.2,000/-.

        The learned trial Court took the view that the suit IS for declaring the sale-deed dated 11-6-1979 to be void which related to the property or which the market value was worth Rs. 12,000/-, and therefore, it had no pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit of that valuation, and as such, directed for return of the plaint for presentation to the proper Court. In appeal, the learned lower appellate Court, relying on the decision in Partap and another v. Puniya Bai and others (1976 JLJ 703), set aside the. order of the trial Court by holding that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to seek the relief of setting aside the sale-deed dated 11-6-1979, as according to the plaint allegations, the sale deed was Mt only avoidable but void ab initio.

        Held : A close scrutiny of the plaint as a whole will go to show that the plaintiff has tried to make out a case that she was not a party to the sale deed as her signatures were obtained by fraud and misrepresentation by misguiding her that it was a hospital form for registration of her name as a patient for treatment. it is the bounden duty of the Court to look to the substance of the claim and not only to the form in which the relief has been asked for. In a case where the plaintiff being a party to a document alleges that it was not executed by him but it is forged or fraudulent, he need not seek the consequential relief of setting aside or cancellation of the document.

        In such a case even if the relief for setting aside the document or for its cancellation is asked for. It will in substance be regarded a relief for mere declaration that it is void. for the reason that when a person impeaches a document having been forged or fraudulent, then to refer to him as being a party to it, would be an obvious misuse of the words. In such a case to ask for the consequential relief of cancellation or setting aside the document would be a meaningless surplusage because for such a void document which is alleged to be forged fraudulent and obtained by misrepresentation, as far as the plaintiff is concerned, the document, in fact, did not stand at all.

       

        In Prataps case (supra), which was relied on by the lower appellate Court. it was observed that there is a distinction between fraudulent misrepresentation as to character of a document and as to its contents, and where the misrepresentation is both as to the contents as well as to character of the document the transaction wholly void. In such a case. it is not necessary to seek a relief for setting aside the document and no consequential relief is implicit in the relief for declaration which may require ad valorem Court fees under section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act. This view was again reiterated by this Court in Thumari Ba; v. Mankihai [1981 (1) M. P. W. N. Note 63. Almost the same view was taken by a Division Bench of Bombay High Court in Chhoelal Kalidas v. Laxmidas Mayaram and others (AIR 1959 Bombay 517). In the light of the above discussion, I am inclined to follow the same view. Under these circumstances. the learned lower appellate Court committed no error in holding that a mere relief for declaration that the document is void would be enough.

        This brings me to the next question about valuation of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction. According to the learned counsel for the applicant, the value of the property affected by the document in question, settles the value of the relief sought as also the value of the suit for purposes of jurisdiction. But in my opinion, it is not always so. At times, 1t is not the value of the property but it is the value of the relief sought itself which is material, not for purposes of payment of Court fees but also for purposes of jurisdiction in a case like one before me which falls under section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act and section 5 of the Suits Valuation Act. The question of jurisdiction and payment of Court-fees has to be determined on the allegations made in the plaint and relief sought therein, and it is not the form of the plaint, but the essence of it which the Court will take into account to determine the question of jurisdiction and Court-fees in some what similar circumstances, this Court in Badrilal v. Surajbai (1980 MPLJ Note 70) took the view that in a suit for declaration with consequential relief of permanent in injunction, the plaintiff is at liberty to put his own valuation which is neither arbitrary nor baseless. 1976 JLJ 708, 1981 (1) MPWN 63, AIR 1959 Bom. 517, 1980 MPLJ SN 78, AIR 1939 Nag. 50, AIR 1958 SC 245 and AIR 1953 Cal. 755 relied on. Revision dismissed.