On 1-8-1983 when the Judge was on leave the plaintiff filed two applications and the defendant filed on application. The plaintiff sought permission to file a partition-deed dated 8-2-1971. He also sought permission to examine Hajarilal, an attesting witness of the partition-deed. He stated that Hajarilal was present in the Court. The defendant's application was for an order to the plaintiff to give his specimen signatures in Court so that a handwriting expert may use them for giving his opinion on a disputed signature on the agreement (Ex. D. No.1).

On 11-10-1983 the Judge allowed the plaintiff's applications and rejected the defendant's application by passing orders in the order sheet. The defendant bas come up in revision against the orders.

In fact, a specimen signature, if given by a party to the suit or proceeding in open Court in presence of his counsel and the Presiding Officer of the Court and the opposite party or its counsel has one advantage that the authorship of such signatures would not require formal proof and on that score nobody can have any grievance. The utility of such specimen signatures for being used for comparison with disputed signatures is too obvious to need elucidation. The learned Judge did not keep the aforementioned consideration in view and directed the defendant to use the plaintiff's standard signatures on record and without specifying what signature were being termed as standard sigl1atures. After al1 it was the defendant's requirement: the Court had no jurisdiction, to ask the defendant to use unspecified and so-called standard signatures on record. The order, if allowed to stand, would cause irreparable injury to the defendant because he would be deprived of a valuable piece of evidence in support of his case on the factum of the disputed signatures. The order in question is, therefore, liable to be set aside under section 115, C.P.C. Instead, the defendant's application in question deserves to be allowed,

The petitioner's learned counsel's first grievance against the order of grant of permission to the non-petitioner to file the partition-deed is that the cause for earlier non-production was not considered in the order itself.

Learned counsel replied that the petitioner did not question in his written reply the cause shown namely tracing of the document after its misplacement.

I agree with the latter submission. Hence the order's propriety cannot be questioned in revision on the ground that the order did not consider the cause shown for the earlier non-production of the partition deed.

The petitioner's learned counsel urged that the permission to produce the document could not have been given because the document was not pleaded and was inadmissible in evidence.

The language of Order 13, Rule 2, C.PC does not cast any obligation on the Court to see that the document sought to be produced was admissible in evidence. In fact, the production of the partition-deed along-with the plaint would not have been refused by the Court on the ground that it was not admissible in evidence. Similarly, the partition-deed could have been filed by the party at the first hearing without being required to satisfy the Court that it was admissible in evidence. As such, the party seeking production of a document under/Order 13, Rule 2, C.P.C. cannot be required as a matter of law to also satisfy the Court that the document is admissible in evidence. In fact, the question of admissibility can arise only when a doucument on record is sought to be proved either by obtaining admission of the opposite party or by getting it proved by any witness. I, therefore, over-rule the objection that the Court should have considered the admissibility of the document at the stage the application under Order 13. rule 2 was being considered. Hence it was immaterial at that stage to consider what was pleaded or not pleaded in the plaint.

The partition-deed in question is a registered instrument. It, is therefore, evident that ex f