The fact remains that section 13(1) of the Act cannot be said to have been complied with by the appellant. There was no deposit made within one month of the date of survice of writ of summons before the trial Court clearing all arrears upto -date. No deposits were made month by month on account of rent falling in arrears during the pendency of the proceedings. It appears that the tenants resisted the payment of rent to the best of their ability and capacity as much as they could until they filed this second appeal. Having fought a long drawn battle before the two Courts below, they secured stay of execution of the decree under appeal and it is under pain of that order that they could not afford to avoid and postpone payment of rent in arrears any further and then they made the first deposit on 2.1.84. Can it be said in such circumstances that the tenants have complied with the provisions of section 13(1) of the Act so as to claim protection under section 12(3) of the Act?

The laudable object behind enactment of section 13 is to curb the tendency on the part of incurable and dauntless tenants withholding payment of rent to the landlords no sooner eviction proceeding were filed and thereby cause serious inconvenience to the landlords, also forcing them to bear the burden of payment of court-fees by filing successive claims for recovery of arrears of rent even pendente lite. The protection conferred on the tenants by the legislature by section 12(3) of the Act inspite of their having defaulted in payment of arrears, the landlord having discharged his obligation of serving demand-cum-quit notice, is preconditioned by expecting complying with the provisions of section 13 of the Act. The protection contemplated by section 12(3) is infact not a blanket protection. Section 13 speaks of initial deposit being made within one month of service of writ of summons in a suit or appeal followed by deposits month by month to be made by the 15th of each succeeding month. The Court has been vested with the discretion to condone the delay in deposits but that condonation has to be prayed for and secured by providing justification for exercise of condonation discretion of the Court. It is painful to see in the present case instituted as far back as on 23.4.69 when the tenants were alleged to have been in arrears since 2.8.62, the tenants along with their surety have chosen to offer resistance to their legal and moral obligation of paying rent; the resistance having been offered and persisted in, not only for years but for decades. Not to talk of their legal obligation, the tenants did not have the least courtesy of filing an application seeking condonation of delay in depositing the rent in arrears assigning reasons or even pretext for not making the deposits in time.

It is noteworthy that section 13 as it originally stood applied only to suit. At one time it was a matter of controversy whether it applied to appeals or not. The legislature removed all the controversies by recasting section 13 in the present form by amending it w.e.f. 16.8.83, extending applicability of the provision to appeals as well.

In Second Appeal No.90/86 (Gurubachan Singh v. Vimla Bai) decided on 30.9.92, this Court has, on a review of the available case law on the point, taken the view that an application for condonation is a condition precedent for exercising the jurisdiction vested in the Court in the matter of extension of time appointed for making the initial deposit as well as the monthly deposits. 1970 JLJ 703 (SC) followed. Appeal dismissed.