The main legal point established in the judgment is the requirement of gross and reckless negligence to constitute criminal negligence in medical cases, as well as the distinction between civil and criminal negligence. The judgment also emphasizes the need to protect medical professionals from unnecessary harassment and humiliation.

The order dated 03.11.2012, delivered in case No. G.R. 454 of 2007 by the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Agartala, West Tripura, is challenged in this petition filed under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Cr.P.C.

2. The essential facts which provide the perspective for the challenge may briefly be noted at the outset. One Sukhen Patari lodged a written ejahar in the West Agartala Police Station on 15.06.2005 stating that on 17.06.2005 at about 5 to 5-30 am his wife Nabanita Sarkar (Patari) was admitted in the Sarkar Nursing Home & Clinic for delivery. At about 9 am, Dr. A.K. Roy, the petitioner No.1 caused the delivery by caesarean section and at about 10-30 am his wife was taken out from the operation theatre. The petitioner No.1 reported the informant that his wife was fine. Thereafter, the petitioner No.1 pushed one injection and left the said Nursing Home for breakfast without any discussion with the informant. After sometime a staff of the Nursing Home reported the informant that his wife had expired. As he believed that it was for the rash and negligent act of the petitioner No.1 and the assisting Surgeon, his wife died, he lodged the written ejahar. On completing the investigation, the police filed the final police report charge sheeting the petitioners for committing the offences punishable under Section 304 A of the IPC. The petitioners are on bail. The statement of accusation was proposed to be read to the petitioners under Section 251 of the Cr.P.C. At that point of time, the petitioners by filing an application before the trial court on 12.10.2010 claimed their discharge from the accusation. By the impugned order dated 03.11.2012, the said prayer was rejected by the trial court.

3. Mr. H.K. Bhowmik, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has fairly submitted that there is no provision akin to Section 239 of the Cr.P.C. in the trial of summon cases by the Magistrate. Section 239 of the Cr.P.C. categorically provides that if, upon considering the police report and the documents sent with it under Section 173 and making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate considered the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for doing so.

4. Provisions of Section 239 of the Cr.P.C. as laid under Chapter XIX of the Cr.P.C. are specific to the trial of warrant cases by the Magistrate. As such, the said provisions have no manner of application in the trial of summons cases by the Magistrate. Section 251 of the Cr.P.C. clearly provides that when in a summon case the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate the particulars of the offence of which he is accused, shall be stated to him, and he shall be asked whether he pleads guilty or has any defence to make but it shall not be necessary to frame a formal charge. One exception so far the trial of summon cases by Magistrate is concerned has been curved out in Section 256 of the Cr.P.C, which is entirely for a different purpose. It provides that if the summons has been issued on the complaint and on the day appointed for the appearance of the accused, or any day subsequent to which the hearing may be adjourned, the complainant does not appear to the Magistrate shall notwithstanding anything contained in the Court acquit the accused, unless for some reason he thinks it proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some other day, provided that, where the complainant is represented by the pleader or by the officer conducting the prosecution where the Magistrate is of the opinion that the personal attendance of the complainant is not necessary, the Magistrate may dispense his attendance and proceed with the case there for. Only in the event of nonappearance of the complainant on the appointed date, the Magistrate may discharge the accused and not in any other case.

5. Mr. B