The time frame for filing a reply under Order VIII Rule 1 is directory and not mandatory.

1. Heard Mr. J Majumdar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners as well as Mr. Samarjit Bhattcharjee, learned counsel appearing for the respondent.

2. This is a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for interfering with the order dated 29.01.2018 delivered in M.S. 35/2017 by the Civil Judge, Sr. Div. Court No.1, West Tripura, Agartala.

3. The defendant-petitioners filed an application under Section 148 of the CPC for extension of time for filing the written statement, but by the impugned order dated 29.01.2018 the said prayer for extension of time has been rejected on the ground that the summon upon the defendants were served on 03.11.2017 and as such, on that date, i.e. 29.01.2018 the statutory period of 90 days had elapsed and as such the Court was not in a position to grant further time to file the written statement.

4. Mr. Majumdar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has clearly stated that since all on a sudden the appointed attorney declined to function as the authorized agent of the defendants, they were in a fix and they could not take proper steps but subsequently they nominated and engaged another person as their attorney to look after their case but, in the meanwhile, this order had been passed.

5. Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel appearing for the respondents have also stated that since the petitioner was not serious about prosecuting the case, this Court may not interfere with the impugned order.

6. Having appreciated the submission made by the learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the view that the interpretation as projected by the Civil Judge, Sr. Div., Court No.1, West Tripura, Agartala is untenable inasmuch as in Salem Advocate Bar Association, T.N. vs. UOI, reported in (2005) 6 SCC 344 the Apex Court has unambiguously held that the time frame as provided to file the reply under Order VIII Rule 1 is not mandatory but directory in nature. There may be a fewer exceptional cases. For purpose of reference in respect of extension of time after the period of 30 days, the observation of the Apex Court as reflected in Salem Advocate Bar Association, T.N.(supra) reads as under:

“41. The amendment made in Section 148 affects the power of the Court to enlarge time that may have been fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by the Code. The amendment provides that the period shall not exceed 30 days in total. Before amendment, there was no such restriction of time. Whether the Court has no inherent power to extend the time beyond 30 days is the question. We have no doubt that the upper limit fixed in Section 148 cannot take away the inherent power of the Court to pass orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of process of Court. The rigid operation of the section would lead to absurdity. Section 151 has, therefore, to be allowed to fully operate. Extension beyond maximum of 30 days, thus, can be permitted if the act could not be performed within 30 days for the reasons beyond the control of the party. We are not dealing with a case where time for doing an act has been prescribed under the provisions of the Limitation Act which cannot be extended either under Section 148 or Section 151. We are dealing with a case where the time is fixed or granted by the Court for performance of an act prescribed or allowed by the Court.

42. In Mahanth Ram Das v. Ganga Das [AIR 1961 SC 882], this Court considered a case where an order was passed by the Court that if the Court fee was not paid by a particular day, the suit shall stand dismissed. It was a self-operating order leading to dismissal of the suit. The party's application filed under Sections 148 and 151 of the Code for extension of time was dismissed. Allowing the appeal, it was observed:

"How undesirable it is to fix time peremptorily for a future happening which leaves the Court powerless to deal with events that might arise in between, it is not