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2018 Supreme(Tri) 128

IN THE HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA AT AGARTALA
ARINDAM LODH, J.
Udarung Reang W/o Lt. Bilaxman Reang - Petitioner
Versus
Sri Punkhiroy Debbarma S/o Reshnay Debbarma & Ors. - Respondents
IA 01 of 2017 in MAC 64 of 2017
Decided On : 10-05-2018

Advocates:
Advocate Appeared:
For the Petitioner: Mr. S.B. Debnath
For the Respondents: Mr. P. Gautam

The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation and application of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, emphasizing the need to fulfill its conditions and substantiate 'sufficient cause' under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for the exclusion of time in pursuing civil proceedings.

Headnote:

Condonation of Delay - Motor Accident Claims Tribunal - Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, Section 166, Section 14 of the Limitation Act - The court discussed the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act and its interpretation, emphasizing the need for the plaintiff to fulfill certain conditions to benefit from the exclusion of time. The court also highlighted the liberal interpretation of Section 14 and the requirement to substantiate 'sufficient cause' under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The decision focused on condoning the delay of 433 days in preferring the appeal based on the petitioner's reasonable diligence and good faith in pursuing the proceedings.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner filed a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 claiming compensation for the death of her husband. The claim was dismissed due to the failure to submit proof of being the deceased's wife. Subsequently, a review application was filed, which was also dismissed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. The petitioner then appealed to the Court, seeking condonation of a 433-day delay in filing the appeal.

Finding of the Court:

The Court found that the delay in filing the appeal was caused by the pendency of the review application before the Tribunal and that the petitioner had shown reasonable diligence in pursuing the proceedings. The Court emphasized the need to fulfill the conditions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act and the requirement to substantiate 'sufficient cause' under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

Issues: The issues revolved around the dismissal of the claim petition, the subsequent review application, and the delay in filing the appeal, leading to the consideration of whether the delay should be condoned.

Ratio Decidendi: The Court's decision was based on the interpretation of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the fulfillment of its conditions, and the requirement to substantiate 'sufficient cause' under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, ultimately leading to the condonation of the delay in filing the appeal.

Final Decision: The Court allowed the petition, condoned the delay of 433 days in preferring the appeal, and disposed of the matter without ordering costs.

JUDGMENT :

This is a petition for condonation of delay of 433 days in preferring the appeal against the judgment and award dated 08.03.2016 passed in Title Suit (MAC) 426/2013 by the learned Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Court No.4, West Tripura, Agartala.

2. Briefly stated, the facts are that the petitioner had filed claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 claiming compensation for the death of her husband who was aged about 55 years and used to earn Rs.15,000/- per month. During the course of the proceedings, learned Tribunal found that the claimant Smt. Udarung Reang could not submit the Survival Certificate or any other identity card in proof of the fact that she was the wife of the deceased Bilaxman Reang and due to such failure the Tribunal dismissed the claim petition vide judgment and award dated 08.03.2016, as stated above.

3. Thereafter, the claimant-petitioner had filed a review applicant under Order XLVII Rule 1 read with Section 114 of the CPC before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal and the said application was registered as Civil Misc.(R)06/2016. From the order dated 28.08.2017 it has come to light that the claimant-petitioner came to learn that her claim was rejected due to non-furnishing of any proof that she is the wife of deceased Bilaxman Reang. With the review application the claimant-petitioner had submitted the Register of Ordinary Residence (ROR) issued by the office of the Kakracherra ADC Village which substantiates that the claimant-petitioner is the wife of deceased Bilaxman Reang. However, the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal dismissed the review petition on the ground that there is no provision in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 empowering the Tribunal to review its own order.

4. Being aggrieved by the said order dated 28.08.2017 dismissing the review application, the claimant-petitioner has preferred the present appeal before this Court along with a petition for condonation of delay of 433 days in preferring the said appeal.

5. Mr. SB Debnath, learned counsel for the claimant-petitioner has submitted that the delay has been caused due to the pendency of the review application before the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. I find that the review application was filed on 29.03.2016 before the learned Tribunal, i.e. within the prescribed period of limitation for filing review application and just few days after the dismissal of the review application, the claimant-petitioner has preferred the present appeal on 14th September, 2017.

6. Mr. Debnath has candidly submitted that there was no laches on the part of the claimant-petitioner in preferring the appeal before this Court and the delay has been caused for choosing of the wrong forum. Learned counsel for the claimant-petitioner further submits that the claimant-petitioner has been prosecuting her case before the Tribunal with due diligence and as such the time spent in the review proceeding is required to be excluded in view of the provision of Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

7. Section 14 of the Limitation Act reads as follows:-

“14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction.–

(1) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or in a court of appeal, against the defendant, shall be excluded, where the proceeding is founded upon the same cause of action and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction, or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.”

8. In the case of Ghasi Ram Vs. Chait Ram Saini, 1998 6 SCC 200, it is held by the Apex Court that the party seeking benefit of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Limitation Act must fulfill the following 4 (four) conditions:-

“(1) The plaintiff who filed the suit had been prosecuting another civil proceeding with due diligence.

(2) The earlier












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