The quashing of an FIR should not lead to disqualification for employment, especially when it does not result in adverse antecedents. The Rules for appointment should be strictly interpreted in determining disqualifications.

The instant petition has been filed by the candidate who was finally selected in Group-D post after undergoing the process of selection and placed in the order of merit. At one stage, appointment was offered to him vide order dt. 8th February, 2016 but that came to be cancelled by the respondents vide order dt. 9th September, 2016 on the premise that at one stage FIR No. 2015WAG161 dt. 8th November, 2015 was registered against him u/Sec. 3, 4, 5, 6 (2) (4) & 7 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 but indisputably the FIR was challenged by the petitioner in Crl. Petn. No. 14 of 2016 and this Court in exercise of its powers u/Sec. 482 of the Code quashed the FIR vide judgment dt. 1st July, 2016.

2. Since his offer of appointment was cancelled even after quashing of the FIR dt. 8th November, 2015 vide judgment dt. 1st July, 2016 he approached this Court by filing a writ petition in the earlier round of litigation being WP(C) 1286 of 2016 and that was disposed of vide order dt. 18th April, 2017 with a direction to the petitioner to make a fresh representation to be considered in accordance with law.

3. In compliance of the order of this Court dt. 18th April, 2017 a fresh representation was submitted by the petitioner and that was revisited by the Full Court in its meeting held on 9th June, 2017 and prima facie arrived to the conclusion that though the criminal proceedings instituted against the petitioner has been quashed by this Court in Crl. Petn. No. 14 of 2016 but his conduct does not generate confidence for employment in the service of the High Court and taking note thereof, and in terms of the resolution of the Full Court, his representation was rejected vide communication dt.13th June, 2017 which is the subject matter of challenge in the instant writ petition.

4. It is not the case of the respondents that the name of the petitioner does not find place in the order of merit against the advertised vacancies and in the ordinary course he would have been considered for appointment but because of the impediment of the FIR being registered at one stage he was not considered suitable for appointment.

5. It is also not disputed that apart from the FIR once registered against him, there are no other criminal antecedents which may deny him from consideration for appointment. This Court would further like to note that under the High Court of Tripura Services (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Conduct) Rules, 2014 (for short, “Rules, 2014”) and Rule 9 casts an impediment for the persons who could be disqualified for appointment and R. 9(c) states that a person shall be disqualified for appointment if he has been convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude. Indisputably, the petitioner does not carry any of the disqualification for appointment as envisaged u/R. 9 of the Rules, 2014.

6. R. 9 of the Rules, 2014 relevant for the purpose is reproduced hereunder:

“9. Disqualification for appointment – No person shall be eligible for appointment to the service –

(a) unless he is a citizen of India; or

(b) if he has been dismissed from service by the Government, Central Government, High Court, statutory or Local Authority; or

(c) if he has been convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude; or

(d) if he has more than one spouses living; or

(e) if he directly or indirectly tries to influence or influences the recruiting authority by any means for his candidature.”

7. The submission of the petitioner’s counsel is that it is not a case of concealment or misrepresentation on his part and once the FIR registered against him, which in his view was a case of false implication, has been quashed by this Court, he has a clean record and in the given circumstances there appears no reason to deprive him from seeking employment and his offer of appointment has been arbitrarily rejected by the authority which needs interference of this Court. In support of his submission, counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of th