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HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA AT SHILLONG
Sanjib Banerjee, W. Diengdoh, JJ.
North Eastern Electric Power Corporation Ltd (Neepco) & Ors. - Appellants
Versus
Bidul Goswami - Respondent
WA No. 38/2022 in WP(C) No. 423/2022
Decided On : 01-11-2022
Transfer - Administrative Law - NEEPCO Transfer Policy Rule 15, Rule 17
Fact of the Case:
The writ petitioner challenged a transfer order citing ill-health of his aged mother as a ground to allow him to continue in his present place of posting. The employer refused to accede to the request, leading to a series of legal proceedings.
Finding of the Court:
The Court found that the employer's refusal to accede to the writ petitioner's request was justified as the functional criticality or requirement of the employer outweighed other considerations. The Court held that transfers cannot be stopped on the flimsy ground of age or infirmity of elderly parents of government employees.
Issues: The issues included the interpretation of NEEPCO Transfer Policy Rule 15 and Rule 17, the consideration of special grounds for resisting a transfer, and the authority of the employer in freely transferring an employee.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court emphasized that the employer's administrative reasoning for the transfer should be given priority unless a case of egregious mala fides is made out. It held that the writ petitioner's grounds for resisting the transfer were not extraordinary and did not warrant interference by the Court.
Final Decision: The appeal succeeded, and the writ petitioner was directed to join his transferred place of posting within two months from the date of the last reconsidered decision of the employer. The writ petition was disposed of, and the interim order impugned was set aside.
JUDGMENT
Sanjib Banerjee; CJ. - The appeal is directed against an interim order passed on a writ petition challenging an order of transfer. Quite inexplicably, the order impugned requires status quo to be maintained, effectively stalling the transfer.
2. It is too late in the day to emphasise that the High Court's authority to interfere in matters of transfer is very limited and unless a case of egregious mala fides is made out, the High Court must yield to the administrative reasoning of the employer. Indeed, once an employer cites administrative exigencies for the transfer of an employee who holds a transferable job, it is almost the end of the matter and the High Court ought not to interfere therein.
3. In this case, the writ petitioner-respondent was issued a transfer order on or about June 10, 2022 after serving in and around this area for nearly 16 years. The transferred place of posting is Tawang. Shortly upon receipt of the transfer order, the writ petitioner made a representation, citing the ill-health of his aged mother as a ground to allow him to continue in his present place of posting. The representation was disposed of by a terse order and a release order of June 29, 2022 followed.
4. The writ petitioner challenged the entire lot by way of an initial petition under Article 226 of the Constitution that was disposed of by this Court by an order of July 29, 2022. The Court, at that stage, found that the representation had not been adequately dealt with and merely required the representation to be reconsidered.
5. Upon reconsideration of the matter, a speaking order followed from the employer on August 5, 2022, which again was supplemented by a further reconsidered order of September 15, 2022. The decision remained the same. Another letter was issued by the employer on September 16, 2022 requiring the writ petitioner to immediately join his transferred place of posting. A third writ petition came to be instituted. By the interim order impugned dated October 18, 2022, the employer was directed to file an affidavit clarifying certain matters. In the meantime, status quo was directed to be maintained with regard to the movement of the writ petitioner. It is the sting of the status quo in the tail of the interim order that the employer is aggrieved by.
6. The clarification that the Court required follows the observation at paragraph 7 of the impugned order:
'7. On perusal of the said impugned order, it indicates that the respondent Corporation while making reference to the order passed by this Court has however, referred to the letter dated 05.08.2022, which on the said date was no longer in existence. Further, it is noted that the respondent Corporation has also stated therein that the joining to the new place of posting by the petitioner will be subject to the outcome of the final disposal of the writ petition pending before this Court. Again on the date of the said order i.e. dated 16.09.2022, there was no writ petition pending, inasmuch as, the writ petition has been disposed of on 12.09.2022, as evident from the records annexed as Annexure-M to the writ petition.'
7. With respect, the substance of the matter was the transfer of an employee and the perceived anomalies noticed were incidental and too insignificant to be given any credence in the larger context.
8. Two principal grounds have been urged by the writ petitioner in resisting his transfer. The first ground is that even if his representation is rejected, there is a period of 60 days which is permitted to the employee before he has to join the transferred place of posting. The writ petitioner claims that in the communication of September 16 2022, the employer acted in breach of Rule 17 of the applicable transfer rules by calling upon the writ petitioner to immediately report to the transferred post. The second ground urged is that the transfer rules require a certain committee to be constituted to look into the representation of an employee who has been served an orde
The employer's administrative reasoning for a transfer holds overriding priority, and transfers cannot be stopped on flimsy grounds. The Court should refrain from interfering in transfer matters unle....
The central legal point established in the judgment is the importance of the employer's discretion for better administration in employee transfers, and the limited scope of judicial review under Arti....
The court emphasized that a challenge to an order of transfer should normally be eschewed and should not be countenanced by the courts or tribunals as though they are Appellate Authorities over such ....
Transfer of an employee is an essential condition of service and can only be interfered with in exceptional circumstances. Courts have limited jurisdiction to interfere in transfer matters.
Judicial review of transfer orders is limited; transfers are inherent to service unless proven otherwise.
The transfer of contract employees is permissible under certain conditions as provided in the terms of the contract and relevant policies.
Judicial review of transfer orders is limited to cases of mala fides or statutory violations; transfers are normal incidents of service.
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