IMPORTANT POINT
The central legal point established in the judgment is the importance of establishing the identity of the perpetrator, the impact of alibi on the overall appreciation of the matter, and the requirement for affirmative evidence to establish the identity of the offender.

JUDGMENT

Sanjib Banerjee, CJ. - The appellant has been convicted under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and sentenced to ten years' rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs.1 lakh. In default of payment of the fine, the appellant has to suffer further simple imprisonment for five months.

2. The principal ground urged by the appellant is that the appellant was not sufficiently identified as the offender or even being present at the place of occurrence at the time that the offence is said to have been committed. In particular, the appellant refers to the statement of the victim to the effect that it was the victim's mother who named the appellant to the victim; the fact that the relationship that the victim described as between the victim and the appellant was completely incorrect; and, most importantly, the retraction by PW 2 in course of her re-examination after having initially said that shortly after the incident occurred, PW 2 had seen the victim and the appellant having kwai.

3. The other major ground raised by the appellant is that there was a perfect alibi set up by the appellant and three other witnesses along with the appellant testified to the fact that for most of the day on May 28, 2015, particularly during the afternoon and evening of that day, the appellant was at Saipung village, which is at least a three hours' drive from the appellant's village of Shnongrim in the East Jaintia Hills District. Shnongrim and Lum Bangla Nongkhlieh, where the victim resides, are neighbouring villages. According to the appellant, little or no reason has been indicated in the impugned judgment of December 7, 2021 as to why the testimonies of the defence witnesses were disregarded despite the three others called to the witness box by the appellant corroborating the appellant's version of where the appellant was and what he was doing on May 28, 2015.

4. A further point made on behalf of the appellant is that there is no explanation as to why the First Information Report was lodged on June 8, 2015 despite the incident having allegedly occurred on May 28, 2015. It is also pointed out on behalf of the appellant that in the format of the FIR as prevalent in this State, there is a column for indicating the reasons for the delay in lodging the FIR. In the present case, despite the FIR being lodged some 11 days after the incident, no explanation in such regard was furnished at the relevant time.

5. The appellant asserts that there is no credible version of any witness having seen the appellant in the victim's village or thereabouts at or about the time that the incident occurred. The appellant maintains that if the FIR-maker - the mother of the victim - had, indeed, seen the appellant lurking around her residence shortly before the alleged incident took place, in the normal course, it would be expected of her to indicate at the very first instance that she had seen the appellant around her house shortly prior to the incident. The appellant places the statement recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 by the investigating officer immediately after receiving the FIR, wherein there is no mention of the mother of the victim claiming to have seen or noticed the appellant outside her residence shortly before the incident occurred. While on the evidence of the victim's mother in course of the trial, the appellant goes back to such witness' initial statement recorded under Section 161 of the Code to suggest that she made up a story subsequently by introducing a few allegations to embellish her original statement and to falsely implicate the appellant. Towards such end, the appellant demonstrates from the testimony of the mother that she claimed that a day after the incident, she was informed of the same by her 15-year-old niece, who deposed as PW 2, upon the victim apparently disclosing such fact to PW 2. However, the mother testified that when she asked the victim, the victim did not speak of