The validity of the special permit under the Motor Vehicles Act and the responsibility of the insurance company to pay compensation based on the permit's authenticity.

Laxmi Kanta Mohapatra, J.

1. National Insurance Co. Ltd. has filed this appeal against the award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Manipur (hereinafter referred to as MACT) in MACT Case No. 116 of 2010. On 16.7.2010 while the deceased, Leimapokpam Ingocha Singh and Yumlembam Pishak Singh, were walking on road on Thongjao Awang Leikai at about 8.30 p.m. they were knocked down by the offending vehicle and all of them sustained bodily injuries. The deceased, Jugeshwor Singh, was seriously injured and succumbed to the injuries later while he was being taken to RIMS, Imphal.

2. Claimant No. 1 is the wife of the deceased and the claimant nos. 2 and 3 are the minor daughter and son of the deceased. The owner and driver of the vehicle were made respondent Nos. 1 and 2 before the Tribunal and the present appellant, insurance company, was the respondent No. 3 before the Tribunal.

3. It is the case of the claimants that the deceased was working as a teacher in a private school and was earning Rs. 6,000 per month. Considering the age of the deceased, claimants claimed a total amount of Rs. 14,00,000 towards compensation. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2, who were the driver and the owner of the offending vehicle, filed a joint written statement denying the allegations made in the claim petition and also took a plea that the vehicle was insured with the present appellant.

4. The present appellant filed a written statement denying the allegations made in the claim petition and it was the case of the insurance company that the claimants, owner and driver of the vehicle, in collusion, have filed the claim petition.

5. The Presiding Officer, MACT, on analysis of the evidence adduced in the case, came to the conclusion that on the date of accident, the offending vehicle was covered with a special permit issued under section 88(8) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the owner of the vehicle was authorised to operate the vehicle in between Waikhong and Kakching. The Presiding Officer also came to the conclusion that the deceased sustained serious physical injuries in course of the accident and ultimately succumbed to the injuries and that the vehicle was being driven in a rash and negligent manner. Taking into consideration the age of the deceased as 45 years and the annual income as Rs. 46,788, the Tribunal allowed compensation of Rs. 4,06,660.

6. Mr. K. Pradeep, learned counsel appearing for the appellant insurance company, challenged the award solely on one ground. It was contended by the learned counsel that on the date of accident the vehicle was not covered with any route permit. It was also submitted that the special permit stated to have been issued under section 88(8) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is a forged document and the court should not have relied upon such a document and since the vehicle was being plied on the road on the basis of a fake permit, the insurance company is not liable to pay the compensation.

7. Learned counsel, Mr. Th. Tolapishak, appearing for the respondents submitted that in absence of a regular route permit, special permit could be granted under the relevant provision as stated above and on the basis of such special permit the vehicle was being plied in between Waikhong and Kakching. Since the accident took place during the period when such special permit was valid, there being no dispute about the vehicle being insured with the present appellant, the appellant is liable to pay the compensation. The only issue raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is with regard to the special permit granted in respect of the offending vehicle under Exh.A12. On perusal of the said document, it is found that the vehicle was allowed to ply in between Waikhong and Kakching for the period from 11.6.2010 to 15.8.2010. Undisputedly, the accident took place on 16.7.2010 when the special permit was in operation. With regard to the said special permit, it was contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that after