1. The revenue has filed IT Appeal No. 107 (Nag.) of 1981. The assessee has filed cross-objection No. 5 (Nag.) of 1981. In addition, the assessee has also filed an appeal in which the same grounds. are taken as in the cross-objection and that appeal is IT Appeal No. 157 (Nag.) of 1981. All these relate to the assessment year 1972-73. 17 Appeal No. 157 (Nag.) of 1981 has been filed late and the assessee has filed an application for condonation of delay. According to the assessee's application, the delay occurred because the assessee's appeals were heard in Delhi being transferred from time to time by the President on the application of the assessee for the earlier years. For this year, the assessee sent the papers to Delhi for filing the appeal but it was later on found that the appeal should have been filed only at Nagpur. In this process a short delay occurred. Having perused the assessee's application and also having heard the arguments of both the sides, we Condone the delay. As already mentioned, the grounds taken in the appeal are identical with the grounds taken in the cross- objection and, therefore, it makes no difference even if we condone the delay and hear the appeal along with the cross-objection.

2. At the outset, the learned standing counsel, Shri Wazir Singh, argued that we have no jurisdiction to hear the appeals as the President had no power to transfer these appeals from Nagpur Bench to. Delhi Bench. He pointed out that by general order, namely, Standing Order No. 1 of 1973, the jurisdiction of the different Benches of the Tribunal has been set out in accordance, with the power given to the President under rule 4 of the income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963 and, therefore, that power is exhausted. Secondly, for transferring an appeal from one Bench to another, the President should have followed the principles of natural justice and the transfer is discriminatory because it causes inconvenience and hardship to the Commissioner. He relied on the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in 18 STC 50 (sic). He has also referred to the decisions in [1948] 16 ITR 521 (sic) and Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India [1956] 29 ITR 717, 723 (SC).

3. In our view, the objection raised by Mr. Wazir Singh is devoid of any substance. Section 255 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ('the Act') deals with the procedure to be followed by the Tribunal. Sub-section (1) of section 255 states that the powers and functions of the Tribunal would be discharged by Benches constituted by the President. No doubt, the Bench should consist of two members in accordance with sub-section (2) of section 255. The other sub-sections deal with the constitution of Special Benches and assigning cases to a Third Member in case of a difference of opinion and other related matters. Rule 4 reads as follows :

"(1) A Bench shall hear and determine such appeals and applications made under the Act as the President may by general or special order direct.

(2) Where there are two or more Benches of the Tribunal working at any headquarters, the President or, in his absence, the senior most member present may transfer an appeal or an application from any one such Bench to any other."

This rule is made in accordance with the powers vested in the Tribunal to make its own rules for its functioning. As seen from the rule, the President can pass a general order by which cases are assigned to different Benches. He can also pass special order in respect of a class of cases or of a parti-cular case. The general order passed by the President under rule 4 is standing order No. 1 of 1973, which was from time to time amended in conformity with the needs. The President has also the power to pass a special order in respect of a particular case and it is by virtue of this provision that the President can transfer a case from one Bench to another Bench. Mr. Wazir Singh is not right in his submission that once a general order is passed under rule 4, the power of the President