Per Shri M.A.A. Khan, Judicial Member - Under a trust deed dated 23-3-1978, the appellant-trust had come into existence as a public charitable trust It was duly registered as such with the Asstt. Charity Commissioner, Rajkot under the provisions of Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950.

2. While filing its return of income on 27-6-1986 for the accounting period ending 31-3-1984, relevant to the A.Y. 1984-85. the appellant claimed deductions under sections 11, 12 & 13 of the I.T. Act 1961 (the Act). The ITO did not allow such deductions on the ground that appellant’s application for registration under section 12A(9) of the Act, was still pending decision by the authority concerned and not registration had been accorded to it. The ITO further rejected another claim of the appellant for treating the donation of Rs. 1,39,861 towards corpus of the trust. The ITO treated the said donation as appellant’s income in the absence of confirmations from the donors. Aggrieved against the assessment so made by the ITO the appellant approached the CIT(A) in appeal.

3. In appeal the appellant challenged the assessment order, as passed by the ITO, mainly on two grounds. In the first place it was stated that the assessment order, having been passed beyond the prescribed period of limitation, was bad in law. In the second place the treatment meted out to the donation amount of Rs. 1,39,861 was seriously disputed. The learned CIT(A) found no force in either of the two grounds, mentioned above, and dismissed appellant’s appeal. Hence this appeal.

4. Mr. M.P. Sharda, C.A no doubt argued the appeal on the legal issue of limitation as well as on merits of the case itself. But after having heard the learned representatives of both the sides we have been left in no doubt that the assessment in the present case had definitely been made after the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation and therefore, the same was required to be annulled. Being of that view we would confine our discussion to the issue of limitation only.

5. The relevant facts, having a conclusive bearing upon the issue of limitation, are that the assessment year involved is 1984-85 for which appellant’s accounting period ended on 31-3-1984. The appellant could have filed its return for this assessment year up to 30-6-84 as per provisions of section 139(1) of the Act. But, admittedly, the return was filed on 27-6-1986. Obviously the return filed by the appellant on 27-6-1986 did not fall under section 139(1). It was a return filed under section 139(4)(b)(iii) which permitted the appellant to file its return under that provision up to 31-3-1987.

6. Once the return filed by the appellant is found to have been filed under section 139(4) the provisions of section 153(1)(c) stand attracted, for the purposes of time- limit for completion of the assessment. Clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 153 provides that where a return has been filed under section 139(4) or 139(5) the assessment shall have to be made within one year from the date of filing the return. Since the return in the instant ease was filed under section 139(4) on 27th June, 1986 the assessment could have been made up to 26-6-84. But it was not made by that date as would be clear from the discussion to follow.

7. The assessment order is no doubt dated 25-6-1986 suggesting thereby that the assessment was made on that day. But, as rightly pointed out by Mr. Sharda it is not at all a fact. The assessment order has definitely been anti-dated with a view to save the assessment being hit by the express provisions of section 153(1)(c) of the Act. ITO’s own conduct speaks of volumes in support of such conclusions.

8. It could not be disputed before us that on 27-7-1987 the ITO had issued the following letter to the appellant :-

‘Please refer to the return of income filed for the assessment year 1984-85 on 27-6-1986.

On going through the case records and copy of trust deed filed it is noticed that the trust came into existence on 23-3-1978. Y