P G Chacko, Judicial Member - All the appeals are directed against orders passed by Commissioners in revisionary jurisdiction under Section 84 of the Finance Act, 1994 and the stay applications filed therein seek waiver of pre-deposit of the adjudged dues and stay of recovery thereof. When these applications came up before this bench, a jurisdictional objection was raised on behalf of the department. It was submitted that the impugned orders-in-revision were passed after 19.8.2009 and hence not appealable to the CESTAT under Section 86 of the said Act. In other words, this Appellate Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to entertain the appeals (and stay applications) filed against revisionary orders passed by Commissioners after 19.8.2009. On this basis, it was prayed on behalf of the department that all the appeals along with the applications be dismissed as not maintainable. This prayer was vehemently opposed on behalf of the appellants. In this situation, a detailed hearing was held on the jurisdictional issue.

2. The learned Additional Commissioner (AR) submitted that, with the substitution of a new text for the old text of Section 84 of the Finance Act, 1994 with effect from 19.8.2009 under the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 (Act No.33 of 2009), the remedy of revision, by the Commissioner of Central Excise, of an order passed by an adjudicating authority subordinate to him stood replaced by the remedy of appeal to the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals). However, any order passed by an adjudicating authority subordinate to the Commissioner immediately before 19.8.2009 could be revised by the Commissioner even after the said date under the old Section 84 by virtue of Explanation contained in the new text of Section 84. But this did not mean that any order passed by the Commissioner in revision after 19.8.2009 could be appealed against under Section 86 of the Finance Act, 1994. Explanation to the new Section 84 did not operate as a saving clause to protect appellate remedy under Section 86 against any revisionary order passed by the Commissioner of Central Excise under the old Section 84 after 19.8.2009. In this connection, it was pointed out that sub-section (1) of Section 86 was also amended with effect from 19.8.2009 to do away with the remedy of appeal to the Appellate Tribunal against any order passed after that date by a Commissioner of Central Excise as revisionary authority. Therefore, it was argued, the present appeals filed against orders passed by Commissioners of Central Excise in revisionary jurisdiction after 19.8.2009 will not be maintainable before the CESTAT. In this connection, the learned Additional Commissioner (AR) referred to an order passed by a learned Single Member of this Tribunal in the case of CCE v. M. Palanimuthu [Final Order No. 559 of 2011, dated 4-5-2011], wherein an appeal filed by the department against an order dated 10.12.2010 passed by the Commissioner of Central Excise, Madurai as revisionary authority under the old Section 84 of the Finance Act, 1994 was rejected as not maintainable. According to the learned Additional Commissioner (AR), the remedy available to a person aggrieved by an order-in-revision passed by a Commissioner after 19.8.2009 is a writ petition to the High Court having jurisdiction.

3. The learned Additional Commissioner (AR), in an obvious bid to pre-empt his opponents who might invoke Section 6 of the General Clauses Act (Act 10 of 1897), submitted that this provision of law also would not secure appellate remedy for the appellants against the impugned orders passed after 19.8.2009 inasmuch as, according to him, the appellants cannot claim any vested right of appeal. In this connection, he relied on the Supreme Court's judgment dated 27.8.2001 in Appeals (Civil) No.5706 and 5707 of 2001 (Ambalal Sarabhai v. Amrit Lal & Co.. The learned Additional Commissioner (AR) argued that any right or privilege under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act was limited to that wh