P.G. Chacko, Judicial Member - These applications filed by the appellants seek waiver of pre-deposit and stay of recovery in respect of the respective adjudged dues which, in appeal No. ST/713/2010, includes an amount of Rs. 4.44 crores demanded towards service tax and education cess and, in Appeal No. ST/228/2011, includes Rs. 2.93 crores demanded towards service tax and education cess, both for more or less for the same period. The appellant in the first appeal had taken up various works to be executed for the Vizag Steel Plant of M/s. Rastriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. (RINL), which works were subcontracted to the appellant in the second appeal. The first appellant is a public sector undertaking and has obtained clearance from the Committee on Disputes for pursuing their appeal. The two appellants are coming within the jurisdiction of different Commissionerates, Commissionerate-I and II respectively. The show-cause notice in the case of the first appellant was issued on 19-12-2007 by Commissioner-I and that in respect of the second appellant was issued on 24-4-2008 by Commissioner-II, both invoking the extended period of limitation under the proviso to Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994. The show-cause notice, issued to the first appellant on the basis of the evidence discussed therein, demanded service tax from the noticee under different heads viz., the 'cargo handling service', 'management, maintenance or repair service', 'commercial or industrial construction service', and 'manpower recruitment or supply agency service'. The show-cause notice to the second appellant demanded service tax under a single head viz., 'cargo handling service'. Insofar as the subject matter of the demand under the head 'cargo handling service' is concerned, it is not in dispute that the demands on both the appellants are on the same set of activities.

2. The case of the first appellant is that the activities undertaken by them under the agreement with RINL were not covered by the definition of 'cargo handling service'. It is their case that they were only handling goods -whether by way of loading, unloading or transportation or stacking - within the factory premises of RINL and therefore these activities would not fall within the ambit of 'cargo handling service'. In other words, for 'cargo handling service' to be applicable, cargo should be handled in terms of the definition of the service between the premises of the service provider and that of the service recipient. There is also a submission made on behalf of the first appellant that 'cargo' and 'goods' are two different things and that the appellant was handling only 'goods' and not 'cargo' and hence cannot be said to have provided 'cargo handling service' to RINL. In this connection, reliance is placed on a few decisions viz., S.N. Uppar & Co. v. CCE [Final Order Nos. 439 & 440 of 2008, dated 12-3-2008]; ITW India Ltd. v. CCE [2009] 18 STT 200 (Bang. - CESTAT), etc. As regards 'management, maintenance or repair service', it is submitted on behalf of the first appellant that, for the period prior to 16-5-2005, service tax was leviable under this head only where the contract was purely one of maintenance. However, the learned counsel has not been able to produce any of the relevant contracts/work orders to enable us to verify the nature of these contracts.

3. As regards 'commercial or industrial construction service', the first appellant obtained registration in February 2005 and has been paying service tax since then. It is also claimed that the activities on which service tax has been demanded under this head were not encompassed by the definition of the service. The learned counsel for the first appellant has also strongly pleaded limitation against the impugned demand. He submits that all the activities were within the knowledge of the department and nothing was concealed. The appellant had been maintaining a bona fide belief that none of their activities was classifiable as 'cargo handl