S. Duggal, Member (J)

1. This appeal to the Tribunal is directed against an order passed by Collector (Appeals), Central Excise, New Delhi, On 25-8-1982. The issue involved falls within a very narrow compass; namely, as to whether the refund claim filed by the appellants in respect to duties paid on 4-2-1978, and 25-2-1978, and given to the Superintendent of the Central Excise, Hardwar, on 31-7-1978, could be considered to be barred by time for the reason that it came to the Assistant Collector on 26-8-1978.

2. The Assistant Collector rejected the claim on the ground, holding that the claim reached him after the expiry of the period of six months as I stipulated by Rule 11. The Appeal to the Appellate Collector was also dismissed, who confirmed the Assistant Collector's view.

3. The appellants, in the Appeal before us, plead that refund claim, which was addressed by them to the Assistant Collector, had been accepted by the Jurisdictional Superintendent on behalf of the Assistant Collector, as he formed part of Central Excise Division, Saharanpur, and accordingly for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Rule 11, date of receipt by the Superintendent should be deemed to be the receipt by the Assistant Collector. It is further contended that it was a practice at the time to submit refund claims through the Sector/Range Officer, which fact is corroborated by Trade Notice issued by the Kanpur Collectorate; being Trade Notice No. 206/1980. The appellants add that their unit during the year 1978, to which period the refund claim relates, formed part of the erstwhile Kanpur Central Excise Collectorate. The appellants also contend that rejection of the refund claim, without issuance of show cause notice to the appellants, also amounted to denial of natural justice.

4. Shri Rameshwar Singh, Consultant, appeared for the appellants when the Appeal was taken up for hearing whereas the Department was represented by Shri S.C. Rohatgi. Shri Rameshwar Singh reiterated the pleas, set out in the grounds of appeal, to the effect that Range Superintendent at Hardwar was part of the Office of the Assistant Collector and, according to the practice prevalent at the time, refund claims were being filed in the office of the Superintendent who was the Range Officer and that this fact is evidenced by a Trade Notice referred to in their appeal; copy whereof has been filed by them. He also handed over a copy of the refund claim, as directed on the earlier hearing, as well as copy of their Memorandum of Appeal, addressed to the Appellate Collector. He further argued that the very fact that the Superintendent had accepted the application, and forwarded the same to the Assistant Collector establishes the existence of such a practice being allowed by the Department, and that the appellants could not be deprived of their legitimate dues, to refund of duty, erroneously paid, on this technical ground.

5. Shri Rohatgi, the learned Departmental Representative, defended the orders passed by the lower authorities, arguing that Assistant Collector being the proper officer who had to sanction refund, the application had to be presented to him and that since on the date, on which the application reached the Assistant Collector, six months' period had already expired; the refund claim was rightly rejected as time-barred, and that there was no infirmity in the view taken by the lower authorities.

6. We have given our careful thought to the matter. We find that the only requirement of law, as contemplated vide Rule 11 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, as then prevailing, was that the application for refund has to be made to the Assistant Collector.

7. We find justification in the appellants' plea that the tenor of the wording of Trade Notice No. 206 of 1980 indicates that in April 1979, a Trade Notice had to be issued to the effect that applications for refund should be made only to the Assistant Collector of Central Excise having jurisdiction, and not to