JUDGMENT :

1. All these appeals have been directed against the order dated 15.03.2021 passed in M.A.No.42 of 2020, M.A.No.46 of 2020, M.A.No.43 of 2020, M.A.No.45 of 2020, and M.A.No.44 of 2020 by the Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad, wherein and whereby the learned Chief Judge quashed the demand notices dt.08.02.2020 issued by the respondent for recovery of tax due amounts holding that the respondent cannot make demand for arrears beyond the three years.

2. The present appeals are at the instance of the respondent before the Chief Judge.

3. The sum and substance of the case of the respondent herein is that all the demand notices except the demand notice under M.A. No.42 of 2020 the demands were made for payment of arrears of property tax from 2013-14 to 31.03.2020, but in M.A. No.42 of 2020 the demand notice was issued for payment of arrears from 2009-10. The demand notices were challenged before the Appellate Judge i.e. Chief Judge, City Civil Court at Hyderabad. By the impugned orders in all these appeals the demand notices were set aside on the ground that they were beyond three years and barred by limitation by placing reliance on the decisions of Division Bench of this Court in V.K. Roy Vs. Commissioner of M.C.H., Hyderabad, 2003(1) ALT 236, and the writ petition No.2272 of 2017 dt. 06.04.2013. Aggrieved by the same, the present appeals are filed by the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation.

4. The contention of the learned Standing Counsel for the appellants is that while setting aside the demand notices, the learned Chief Judge has not taken into consideration the amended provision of Section 278-A of the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act (hereinafter referred to as Act). According to him, all the decisions relied on by appellate Judge for setting aside the demand notices were rendered prior to introduction of Section 278-A of the Act. Prior to amended provision, there was no limitation prescribed under the Act for making a claim. By relying upon the general limitation contained under the Limitation Act, it was held that claim for arrears of more than 3 years cannot be made. Such decisions have no relevancy to the present issue.

5. The learned counsel for respondents herein tried to defend the order of the Chief Judge on the ground that the said orders of the Chief Judge are based on ratios laid down by the Division Bench of this High Court in the judgment cited herein before. According to him, there is no question of law involved in the present appeals and no interference is needed and the appeals are liable to be dismissed.

6. Now, the question of law involved in the present case is:

“Whether the claims under the demand notices dt. 08.02.2020 are barred by limitation?”

7. In this regard, it is apt to refer Section 278-A of the Act which reads as under:

“278-A. Limitation for recovery of dues:- (1) No distraint shall be made, no prosecution shall be commenced and no suit shall be instituted in respect of any sum due to the Corporation on account of a property tax or tax on vehicles and animals or any other sum due under this Act after the expiration of the period of three years from the date on which distraint might have been made or after the expiration of a period of six years from the date on which prosecution might first have been commenced or after the expiration of nine years from the date on which a suit might have been first instituted, as the case may be, in respect of such sum.”

8. A reading of the above provision makes it clear that this amendment was made by Act 15 of 2013 which came into effect from 05.08.2013. It prescribes various limitations for recovery of arrears of taxes. There are three modes of recovery prescribed under the Act i.e. (1) by issuing distraint warrant, (2) by prosecution and (3) by filing a suit.

9. In this regard, it is relevant to refer the respective provisions which are hereunder:

“269. Distress:- (1) If the person liable for the payment of the said tax do