The right to statutory bail under Section 187(3) of the BNSS accrues upon the expiry of the statutory period without a charge sheet, starting from the first FIR registration date when related crimes are involved.

ORDER:

N.TUKARAMJI, J

Heard Mr. Y. Soma Srinath Reddy, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Mr. M. Ramachandra Reddy, learned Additional Public Prosecutor representing the respondent-State.

2. This Criminal Revision Case is filed under Sections 438 and 442 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, “the BNS S ”), assailing the order dated 04.11.2025 passed in Crl.M.P. (SR) No. 12902 of 2025 in Crime No. 98 of 2025 (Old Crime No. 152 of 2025), registered for offences punishable under Sections 61 (2), 316(2), 318(4), and 111 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (for short, “the BNS ”), by the learned XII Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hyderabad.

3.1. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has been arrayed as an accused in nine different crimes, including Crime No. 98 of 2025 of the CCS Police Station, Hyderabad. It is stated that the impugned petition was filed under Section 187 (3) of the BNSS , seeking statutory (default) bail, but was returned by the Magistrate with an office endorsement instead of being adjudicated on merits.

3.2. It is further submitted that this Court, in its common order dated 24.11.2025 in Crl.R.C. Nos. 849 to 852 and 857 of 2025, has already considered identical circumstances involving the same petitioner, arising from related crimes with similar factual backgrounds and registered by the same police station. In that common order, this Court held that the statutory period for the purpose of default bail must be reckoned from the date of registration of the First Information Report (FIR), where the accused was already in custody in related crimes arising from the same set of facts.

3.3. Learned counsel, therefore, contends that the said principle directly applies to the present revision, since the petitioner was already in custody as on 03.08.2025, the date of registration of the present FIR, and that the 90-day statutory period has elapsed without the filing of a final report. Hence, the petitioner has acquired right to statutory bail under Section 187 (3) of the BNSS . Accordingly, it is prayed that the revision be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

4.1 The learned Additional Public Prosecutor contends that although the case was registered on 03.08.2025, it was subsequently transferred to the Central Crime Station (CCS) for specialized investigation owing to the complex nature of the alleged offences relating to surrogacy arrangements. It is argued that each crime involves distinct victims and independent transactions, requiring separate investigation, and that the petitioner’s remand was not formally regularized in the present crime.

4.2. However, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor fairly concedes that this Court, in the common order dated 24.11.2025 in Crl.R.C. Nos. 849 to 852 and 857 of 2025, has held that where the petitioner is already in custody and the subsequent crimes arise from the same set of facts and same police station, the deemed custody principle applies, and the statutory period under Section 187 (3) BNSS must be computed from the date of registration of the FIR. It is also fairly conceded that 90 days have elapsed by the date of the petition and the order of return endorsement. The State, thus, prays that appropriate orders be passed in accordance with law.

5. I have carefully perused the material on record and considered the submissions advanced by both learned counsel.

6. It is undisputed that the petitioner is accused in a series of crimes revolving around surrogacy-related transactions, many of which share a common factual substratum. In several connected matters, the petitioner had filed petitions seeking statutory bail under Section 187 (3) of the BNSS , which were disposed of by this Court through a common order dated 24.11.2025 in Crl.R.C. Nos. 849 to 852 and 857 of 2025.

7. In the said common order, particularly in paragraphs 16 to 20,