The court upheld the validity of a show-cause notice under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, affirming that the adjudicating authority may operate as a single-member bench without violating statutory provisions.

ORDER :

P.Sam Koshy, J.

1. Heard Mr. Syed Ahmed Saud, learned counsel representing Mr. Mir Mukaram Ali, learned counsel for the petitioners; Mr. B.Mukherjee, learned counsel representing Mr. N.Bhujanga Rao, learned Deputy Solicitor General of India for respondent No.1, and Mr. Dominic Fernandes, learned Standing Counsel for Enforcement Directorate, appearing for respondent No.2.

2. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioners under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking quashment of the show-cause notice dated 12.09.2025, issued by respondent No.1, under Section 8 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (for short ‘PMLA Act’).

3. The brief facts of the case relevant for adjudication of the present dispute are that petitioner No.1 is a government employee and has been implicated in an First Information Report registered by CBI, ACB, Hyderabad Branch, vide RC.No.10(A)/2019- CBI/ACB/Hyderabad, dated 08.07.2019, under Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (as amended in the year 2018) and under Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Subsequent to the lodging of the aforementioned First Information Report and charge-sheet being issued, the Enforcement Directorate registered an ECIR under the provisions of the PMLA Act vide ECIR No.ECIR/HYZO/19/2019, and invoking Section 5(1) of the PMLA Act issued Provisional Attachment Order (PAO) No.30/2025, dated 06.08.2025, attaching various movable and immovable properties standing in the name of petitioner No.1 and his family members. Thereafter, the impugned show-cause notice was issued on 12.09.2025 under Section 8 of the PMLA Act.

4. The impugned show-cause notice was assailed primarily on the ground of Coram non judice.

5. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners or the primary ground of challenge was that the impugned show- cause notice is not issued by the proper adjudicating authority under the statute. Another ground raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners was that the authority who had issued the impugned show-cause notice is not a judicial member.

6. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the adjudicating authority mandatorily requires three persons i.e. the Chairperson and two other members. Whereas in the present case, show-cause notice has been issued by only one person. Therefore, the impugned show-cause notice is attracted by doctrine of Coram non judice. He further contended that since the show-cause notice has been issued not by the adjudicating authority as defined under the statute, inasmuch as the show-cause notice having not been issued under the seal and signature of the three member adjudicating authority as is defined under Section 6(2) of the PMLA Act, the entire show-cause notice and the proceedings drawn thereon would get vitiated.

7. Per contra, the learned Standing Counsel for Enforcement Directorate referring to the provisions of Section 6 of the PMLA Act contended that Section 6(2) is not to be read in isolation so as to reach to a conclusion or give an impression that the term ‘adjudicating authority’ has to consist of a Chairman along with two members and in the absence of which the adjudicating agency cannot be treated as an adjudicating authority and it would amount to Coram non judice. Whereas, according to the learned Standing Counsel for Enforcement Directorate, entire Section 6 has to be read as a wh