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2026 Supreme(Telangana) 324

HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
J. Sreenivas Rao, J.
Sekhar Kumar S/o.Upendra Prasad Sah - Petitioner
Versus
The State of Telangana, Represented by SHO Chaitanyapuri Police Station and another - Respondents
Criminal Petition No.785 of 2026
Decided On : 13-03-2026

Advocates Appeared:
For the Petitioner: Mr. N. Abhishek
For the Respondent: Mr. Santosh Kumar Yadav, Mr. Jithender Rao Veeramalla, learned Additional Public Prosecutor

Delay in reporting heinous sexual offences, especially involving minors and breach of trust, is not a ground for quashing proceedings. Additionally, courts cannot grant blanket 'no coercive steps' orders under inherent powers, as such relief constitutes anticipatory bail.

Headnote:(A) Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 376(2)(f) and 354A - Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 - Sections 5 and 6 - BNSS, 2023 - Section 528 (corresponding to Section 482 Cr.P.C.) - Quashing of proceedings - Allegations of sexual assault against a minor - Delay in filing complaint - In heinous crimes, especially sexual offences, delay in lodging the F.I.R. is not uncommon due to trauma, stigma, and social pressures, and cannot be used as a ritualistic formula to discard the prosecution case or as a ground for quashing proceedings, particularly where a relationship of trust and intimidation is involved. (Paras 8, 11 and 12)

(B) Quashing of FIR - Scope and limits - The power to quash should be exercised sparingly and with great circumspection - Police have a statutory right and duty to investigate cognizable offences, and courts should not interfere at the investigation stage unless the F.I.R., on a plain reading, fails to disclose the commission of any cognizable offence - The court cannot conduct a meticulous examination of the truthfulness of allegations at the threshold. (Para 13)

(C) Protection against arrest - Grant of "no coercive steps" order - The court cannot grant a blanket order of "no coercive steps" or "not to arrest" while refusing to quash the F.I.R., as such protection is in the nature of anticipatory bail and must be sought before the competent court under the relevant provisions of law. (Para 14)

Facts of the case:
This is a petition filed by the accused seeking to quash proceedings in an F.I.R. registered for offences under Sections 376(2)(f) and 354A of the IPC and Sections 5 and 6 of the POCSO Act. The complainant alleged that the petitioner, a family acquaintance who acted as a father figure, committed repeated sexual assaults against her starting from her minority in 2019 through 2024. The petitioner sought quashing on the grounds of inordinate delay of over four years in filing the complaint, alleging false implication and extortion. He further requested the court to direct the investigating officer not to take coercive steps against him.

Findings of Court:
The court found that the allegations are serious and pertain to heinous crimes. The delay in reporting is not fatal to the case given the nature of the offence, the victim's minority at the time of initial incidents, and the relationship of trust. Since the investigation is still in progress and the F.I.R. discloses prima facie cognizable offences, there is no ground to quash the proceedings. The request for protection against coercive steps was denied as such relief is reserved for anticipatory bail applications.

Issues: Whether the delay in filing the F.I.R. in a case of sexual assault against a minor justifies the quashing of criminal proceedings and whether the court can grant a blanket order against coercive steps under its inherent powers.

Ratio Decidendi: Delay in reporting sexual offences is not an absolute ground for quashing proceedings due to the inherent trauma and social stigma involved. Furthermore, the inherent power to quash an F.I.R. cannot be used to bypass the statutory process of seeking anticipatory bail by granting protection from arrest.

Result: Criminal petition dismissed.

Legal Category Hierarchy

  • crime and sentencing
    • offences against the person
      • sexual offences
        • rape (Para 1, 2, 7)
        • sexual assault (Para 1, 2, 10)
        • sexual harassment (Para 1)
    • offences against minors
      • protection of children from sexual offences (Para 1, 6, 7)
  • practice and procedure
    • criminal procedure
      • quashing of fir (Para 1, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15)
      • investigation (Para 6, 7, 8, 14)
      • bail and protection from arrest
        • anticipatory bail (Para 14)
        • no coercive steps (Para 14)
      • delay in lodging fir (Para 8, 11, 12)

Table of Contents

1. Quashing of FIR for sexual offences under IPC and POCSO Act — Allegations of repeated sexual assault by family acquaintance. (Para 1 , 2 )

2. Petitioner denied allegations, citing false implication due to extortion motive and delay of 4.5 years in lodging complaint. (Para 3 , 4 , 5 )

3. Delay not fatal in heinous sexual offences due to trauma and intimidation; investigation is ongoing and FIR discloses cognizable offences. (Para 7 , 8 , 10 , 11 , 12 )

4. Power to quash FIR under Section 528 BNSS is sparing; court cannot examine truthfulness at threshold or grant blanket no-coercive-steps protection. (Para 13 , 14 )

5. Criminal petition dismissed. Investigation to continue; any observations confined to this order. (Para 15 , 16 )

6. Can delay in lodging an FIR be a ground to quash proceedings for heinous sexual offences?

No. Delay due to trauma, stigma, and social pressure is not uncommon; it cannot be used as a ritualistic formula to discard the prosecution case at the investigation stage. (Para 8 , 11 , 12 )

7. Can a court grant a blanket order of 'no coercive steps' while refusing to quash an FIR?

No. Such blanket protection is in the nature of anticipatory bail, which must be sought before the competent court under Section 438 Cr.P.C.; granting it is wholly impermissible. (Para 14 )

8. What is the scope of the court's power to quash an FIR under Section 528 BNSS?

The power should be exercised sparingly and with great circumspection; courts should not interfere at the investigation stage unless the FIR, on plain reading, fails to disclose any cognizable offence. (Para 13 )

9. Can the truthfulness of allegations in an FIR be examined at the quashing stage?

No. The court cannot conduct a meticulous examination of the truthfulness of allegations at the threshold, and criminal proceedings should not be scuttled at the nascent stage. (Para 13 )

ORDER :

J. Sreenivas Rao, J.

This Criminal Petition has been filed by the petitioner/accused seeking to quash the proceedings in F.I.R. No.416 of 2024 of Chaitanyapuri Police Station, Rachakonda, registered for the offences under Sections 376(2)(f) and 354A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘the IPC’), and Sections 5 and 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short, ‘the POCSO Act’).

2. Brief facts of the case

2.1. On 01.06.2024, respondent No.2/de-facto complainant lodged a complaint before Chaitanyapuri Police Station, Rachakonda Commissionerate, stating that the petitioner was acquainted with the her family since 2013 and he earned the family's blind trust by posing as a father figure and issued her an Army Dependent Card listing himself as her father and facilitated her B.Sc. Biotechnology admission in Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh, in June 2019, when she was 17 years old. The petitioner gave her shelter in his Delhi Cantonment military quarter, from July 2019, and he began vulgar advances, forced her to remove the towel after bath and tucked her uniform shirt inappropriately despite resistance. On 06.09.2019, and subsequent nights, drugged her dinner to render her semi-conscious before sexually assaulting her multiple times by undressing her, touching and orally assaulting her private parts and attempting penetration. After confronting and relocating within the quarter, she returned to Hyderabad in October 2019 and visited Delhi only to attend exams. After completing her graduation, while staying in a hostel, informed her parents about similar assaults committed by the petitioner on her younger sister and he continued to visit their residence in Hyderabad on about four to five occasions post COVID. During his stay beginning from 21.05.2024, the petitioner allegedly groped her including her private parts. On 24.05.2024 and 25.05.2024, the same was repeated while driving back from a military canteen and after a driving licence test. When confronted by the family, the petitioner allegedly threatened reputational harm by branding her as a characterless girl. The matter was reported to the petitioner’s Commanding Officer on 26.05.2024, who advised that the petitioner would be allowed to return to his unit. Basing upon the said complaint, Crime No. 416 of 2024 has been registered for the aforementioned offences.

3. Heard Mr. S. Acharya Srikrishna, learned counsel representing Mr. N. Abhishek, learned counsel for the petitioner through video conference, Mr. Santosh Kumar Yadav, learned counsel for respondent No.2 appeared through video conference, and Mr. Jithender Rao Veeramalla, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent No.1-State.

4. Submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner

4.1. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner has not committed any offence and has been falsely implicated in the present case. Even according to the allegations made in the complaint, the ingredients of the offences under Sections 376(2)(f) and 354A of the IPC and Sections 5 and 6 of the POCSO Act are not attracted. He further submitted that the alleged allegation of committing rape pertaining to 06.09.2019. However, respondent No.2 lodged the complaint on 01.06.2024 after a lapse of more than 4 ½ years. The mother of the victim was in relationship with the petitioner at their home town in schooling days and that the petitioner has provided financial help to her mother on multiple occasions. When her mother demanded the petitioner to buy a house in her name by obtaining loan in the name of the petitioner, he refused the same. At her instance, respondent No.2 lodged the present complaint to extort the money from the petitioner.

4.2. He further submitted that there is WhatsApp chat, phone call and video call data between the parties and the bank transaction data to disprove the allegations made against the petitioner. If the same is taken into consideration, it proves that respondent N

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