JUDGMENT

1. The appellant in this case filed an appeal against a judgment of the District Court of Bassein on 1st December 1930. The appeal was admitted. An estimate of the copying fees necessary for Bench copies was prepared on 13th March 1931 and issued the next day. On 23rd March a request was made for time to pay the fees and time was given until the 30th. No payment had been made by that day and an extension of time was given until 20th April. By 21st April the fees had still not been paid and the case was struck off for default under the rules of this Court. On 3rd October an application was made to have the case restored to the file. On 5th October a fresh appeal was filed as an alternative as a precautionary measure. The question for our decision is whether the appellant should be allowed to prosecute her appeal either by restoration of the previous appeal or by admission of the appeal filed on 5th October. The appellant Ma Sein has sworn an affidavit to the effect that a letter was sent to her brother on 17th March from Maung Aye Maung, a clerk of her advocate, asking for a remittance of Rs. 172-13-0 for copying fees. She had not the money available then and sent her brother to Rangoon to ask for an extension of time. On 27th March she sent a sum of Rs. 173 by telegraphic money order to Maung Aye Maung and she was under the impression that the copying fees were duly deposited. As a matter of fact the copying fees were never deposited and it may be taken as established that the money was misappropriated by the clerk.

2. The advocate, who appeared for the appellant, has also filed an affidavit. He states that during the pendency of the appeal he received an intimation which led him to leave Rangoon for England on 13th March. Before he left for England he made certain arrangements with regard to his cases. Cases that were complete and ready for hearing he handed over to another advocate. His incomplete cases, which included the present one, he left with his clerk with instructions to him to obtain the assistance of the advocate, Mr. Banerjee, when necessary for those cases. He returned from England on 17th July. On 15th September he received a letter from his client's father asking him about the appeal and saying that the decree-holder had applied for execution of the decree. He then examined the register of appeal cases and found that the appeal had been struck off for non-payment of the copying fees. He could not then find his clerk, Mg Aye Maung, as the latter had absconded as the result of a report made by him to the police regarding the selling of his typewriter during his absence. He thereupon took steps to file the application for restoration of the appeal and the fresh appeal. So far as the application for restoration is concerned it was decided by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Abdul Ganny v. I.M. Russell AIR 1930 Rang 228 that Article 168, Lim. Act, is applicable. That article prescribes a period of 30 days after the date of the dismissal of an appeal for want of prosecution for the filing of an application for re-admission of that appeal. That period of 30 days had long expired when the present application was filed and as Section 5, Lim. Act, is not applicable to such an application, we are bound to hold that this application is barred by the law of limitation.

3. It has been argued on behalf of the appellant that that does not necessarily conclude the matter. In the case of: Sonubai v. Shivajirao Krishnarao AIR 1921 Bom 20, it was held that the provisions of Order 41,. Rule 19, do not exhaust the powers of the Court in a proper case to re-admit an appeal or an application dismissed for default and that it is open to the Court, in exercise of its inherent powers to deal with these applications under Section 151, Civil P.C. and to make an order to that effect for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the Court, without any reference to the period of limitation fixed for applications to re-admit ap