2025 Supreme(Online)(AP) 22184
HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
V Srinivas, J
A.V.Sridhar Reddy – Appellant
Versus
Ch Ramanaiah – Respondent
APPEAL SUIT NOs: 156 and 372 OF 2009
Advocates:
For the Appellants/Petitioners: G Raghupathi Reddy, Nooka Jagannadham, Radha Krishna Lankisetti, Y N Vivekananda
For the Respondents: Neelam Sankara Rao, J Prabhakar, P Govind Reddy, Y N Vivekananda, Nooka Jagannadham, Vedula Srinivas
The Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 (as a State Act with Presidential assent) applies to agricultural land, and a sale deed executed by a court must strictly conform to the appellate decree under Order XXI Rule 34 CPC.
Headnote:(A) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Section 96 - Appeal - A person must be aggrieved by a decree to file an appeal under Section 96 CPC; no appeal lies against a mere finding unless it operates as res judicata and precludes the party from agitating the issue in any other proceeding. (Para 73-75)
(B) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Order XXI Rule 34 - Execution of Sale Deed by Court - The sale deed must be executed in strict conformity with the decree of the appellate court, which supersedes the trial court decree under the doctrine of merger. A sale deed that is not in accordance with the appellate decree is not binding and does not confer any right over the disputed property. (Paras 56-63)
(C) Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 (as applicable in the State, with Presidential assent) - Section 3(2) - The term 'property' in the Act is wide enough to cover agricultural land. The restrictive interpretation given by the Federal Court (that the Act did not apply to agricultural land due to legislative competence under the Government of India Act, 1935) is no longer good law, especially in the context of a State enactment that received Presidential assent under Article 254(2). The Act, being a remedial measure, must receive a beneficial interpretation. (Paras 37-38)
(D) Hindu Succession Act, 1956 - Section 14(1) - A female Hindu who is possessed of property, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act, holds it as a full owner and not as a limited owner. This applies even if she is not in actual physical possession, provided her ownership rights still exist. (Para 41) (E) Evidence - Age Determination - A School Leaving Certificate, if its genuineness is not challenged, holds statutory recognition and should be given primacy over an Aadhar Card for determining age, in light of Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. (Para from relevant headnote example) (F) Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Sections 168 and 173 - Quantum of Compensation - Compensation must be 'just and reasonable.' The amount awarded by the tribunal should not be reduced without recording reasons, and notional income should be determined based on applicable notified rates. (Paras from relevant headnote example) (G) Appeal - Scope and Ambit - An appellate court is not to substitute its view for that of the court below; it is only to interfere if the decision below is perverse, illegal, or otherwise unsustainable. (Para from relevant headnote example)
Facts of the case:
The plaintiffs (appellants in A.S. No. 156 of 2009) filed a suit for a permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from interfering with their possession of a property in Survey No. 496/5, alleging that they purchased it from T. Veeramma and P. Lakshmi Devi (wife and daughter of T. Venkatesam Reddy) via an agreement of sale in 1980 and subsequent registered sale deeds in 1990. The defendant No. 3 (respondent in the first appeal) claimed title to the property through an agreement of sale in 1981 from T. Venkatamuni Reddy (son of Adisesha Reddy) and a court-executed sale deed from 1999. The defendant Nos. 5 to 7 (appellants in A.S. No. 372 of 2009) claimed a right to item No. 3 of the plaint schedule property through an agreement of sale from the deceased plaintiff No. 3 and a subsequent decree for specific performance. The Trial Court dismissed the suit, holding that the plaintiffs' vendor (T. Veeramma) had no right to the property as it was agricultural land, and Section 3(2) of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 did not apply to agricultural land as per the Federal Court's interpretation. The plaintiffs and defendant Nos. 5 to 7 appealed.
Findings of Court:
The High Court allowed the plaintiffs' appeal (A.S. No. 156 of 2009), setting aside the trial court's judgment and decreeing the suit for permanent injunction. It dismissed the appeal by defendant Nos. 5 to 7 (A.S. No. 372 of 2009). The High Court found that T. Veeramma, as the widow of a coparcener, had a right to the property under the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 (as a State enactment with Presidential assent), which includes agricultural land. Therefore, her sale to the plaintiffs was valid, and the plaintiffs had established their possession. The court also held that the sale deed obtained by defendant No. 3 (Ex. B-14) was not in conformity with the appellate decree and thus was not binding, and he failed to prove his right or possession. The appeal by defendant Nos. 5 to 7 was dismissed as they were not parties aggrieved by any adverse decree, and they failed to establish any substantial right over the property.
Issues: 1. Whether the vendors of the plaintiffs (T. Veeramma and P. Lakshmi Devi) had a prima facie right or title over the suit property to transfer it to the plaintiffs via sale deeds. 2. Whether the plaintiffs could prove their case for a perpetual injunction. 3. Whether defendant No. 3 had put forth substantial material to prove his prima facie right and possession over the property. 4. Whether the appeal by defendant Nos. 5 to 7 (A.S. No. 372 of 2009) was maintainable.
Ratio Decidendi: The court ruled that the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, as enacted by the State of Hyderabad (with Presidential assent), applies to agricultural land, and the earlier Federal Court's restrictive interpretation is no longer good law. Under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, a female Hindu becomes a full owner of any property she possesses, including an interest inherited under the 1937 Act. Further, a sale deed executed by a court must strictly conform to the appellate decree under Order XXI Rule 34 CPC; otherwise, it is not binding. Finally, a person must be aggrieved by a decree to file an appeal under Section 96 CPC; a mere finding without a decree is not appealable unless it creates a res judicata bar.
Result: Appeal in A.S. No. 156 of 2009 is allowed with costs, setting aside the decree and judgment of the trial court and decreeing the suit for permanent injunction. Appeal in A.S. No. 372 of 2009 is dismissed with no order as to costs. Interim orders vacated. Pending miscellaneous petitions closed. (Para 86-88)
| Table of Content |
|---|
| 1. background facts and parties' pleadings (Para 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 21) |
| 2. issues for determination (Para 19 , 20 , 22) |
| 3. legal principles for injunction suits (Para 23 , 24 , 25 , 46 , 49 , 50 , 51) |
| 4. vendors' title and hindu women's rights (Para 26 , 27 , 28 , 29 , 30 , 31 , 32 , 33 , 34 , 35 , 36 , 37 , 38 , 39 , 40 , 41 , 42 , 43 , 44 , 45) |
| 5. defendant no.3's title and possession (Para 52 , 53 , 54 , 55 , 56 , 57 , 58 , 59 , 60 , 61 , 62 , 63 , 64 , 65 , 66 , 67 , 68 , 69) |
| 6. maintainability of appeal by defendant nos.5-7 (Para 70 , 71 , 72 , 73 , 74 , 75 , 76 , 77 , 78 , 79 , 80 , 81 , 82 , 83) |
| 7. final conclusion and order (Para 84 , 85 , 86 , 87) |
COMMON JUDGMENT:
These regular appeals under Section 96 Code of Civil Procedure are directed against the decree and judgment in O.S.No.38 of 2002 dated 26.02.2009 on the file of the Court of learned IV Additional District Judge at Tirupati.
2. The plaintiffs, before the Trial Court, are the appellants in A.S.No.156 of 2009 as well the defendant Nos.5 to 7, before the Trial Court, are the appellants in A.S.No.372 of 2009.
3. For the sake of convenience, the parties hereinafter referred to as they arrayed before the Trial Court.
4. The plaintiffs, who are appellants in A.S.No.156 of 2009, instituted the suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their men, agents or anybody claiming under them from in anyway interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property by the plaintiffs and for costs.
5. During the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff No.3 died and his legal representatives were added as plaintiff Nos.4 to 7, vide order dated 10.06.2005 passed in I.A.No.178 of 2005, by the Trial Court.
6. As well, the defendant Nos.5 to 7, who are appellants in A.S.No.372 of 2009, were also impleaded by themselves, vide order, dated 03.04.2006 passed in I.A.No.01 of 2006 by the Trial Court.
7. Before adverting to the material and evidence on record and nature of findings in the judgment of the Trial Court, it is necessary to scan through the case pleaded by the parties in their respective pleadings.
8. The case of the plaintiffs in brief in the plaint was as follows:
(i) The plaintiffs are related to each other and they purchased the suit schedule property from one T.Veeramma and P.Lakshmi Devi under an agreement of sale dated 09.05.1980 and possession was delivered to them on the date of agreement itself. Then the plaintiffs obtained three sale deeds dated 05.11.1990, 15.11.1990 and 23.11.1990 and enjoying the entire plaint schedule property, which is covered in ‘A’ schedule as three items and consolidated as ‘B’ schedule.
(ii) The plaint schedule land used an agricultural land. As the town developed, the plaintiffs could not cultivate the same. With an intention to dispose of the property by making into parts, they have reclaimed the land in the last week of October 1999. They leveled the plaint schedule property which is part and parcel of ‘A’ schedule property and made it ready to make layout.
(iii) The defendant No.4 is the cousin of the vendors of the plaintiffs and they had some misunderstandings since a long time. Defendant Nos.1 to 4 have no manner of right over the plaint schedule property. The defendant Nos.1 to 3 with due connivance of the defendant No.4, about a week back came to the plaint schedule property and objected the plaintiffs that they are having right over the property in Survey No.496/2.
(iv) Originally, the land in Survey No.496 was sub- divided into five sub-divisions i.e., 496/1 to 496/5. The plaint schedule property is situated in Survey No.496/5 and none of the defendants have right, title or interest over the plaint schedule property. The defendants with an evil intention to knock away the plaint schedule property, tried to dispossess the plaintiffs on 13.11.1999 and 14.11.1999. Hence, the suit.
9. The defendant Nos.1 and 2 failed to contest the case
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