A valid application of urgency clause requires the existence of genuine urgency, which was not met in this case, necessitating the quashing of the acquisition notifications.

1. By this petition under Art.226 and Art.227 of the Constitution, the petitioners challenge the validity of notifications issued under S.4 and S.6 of the Land Acquisition Act in July 1975 and October 1975 respectively and the proposed acquisition of 1 hectare and 72 acres of land out of Gat No. 613, situated at village Vaghode Budruk, taluka Raver, District Jalgaon, for a public purpose viz., provision of house sites for landless workers and their families and for extension of gaothan.

2. On 26th July 1971, the Grampanchayat of village Vaghode Budruk passed an unanimous resolution recommending acquisition of Survey Nos. 133 and 134 for the purpose of providing house sites to houseless persons. By another resolution dated 28th July 1972, also passed unanimously, the said Grampanchayat recommended acquisition (for the same purpose) of two additional lands Survey Nos. 129/2/5 and 129/1/2/2. However, the State Government on 25th July 1975 issued notification under S.4 of the Land Acquisition Act , declaring that an altogether different property viz., part of petitioners' land Gat No. 613 was needed or was likely to be needed for the said purpose viz., provision of house sites for landless workers and their families and for extension of gaothan. This notification further declared that the provisions of S.5A of the said Act shall not apply. This was followed on 7th October 1975 by S.6 notification under which urgency clause was applied. Next came S.9 notice. Hence this petition challenging the aforesaid notifications and the impugned acquisition thereunder.

3. In support of this petition, we have heard Mr. G.M. Bhokarikar, the learned Advocate for the petitioners. The State is represented by the learned Assistant Government Pleader, Mr. R.D. Rane.

4. Mr. Bhokarikar, the learned Advocate, contended that this was not at all a case where the application of urgency clause could be said to be in any way warranted. As a result thereof, the petitioners were derived of the opportunity of putting forth their objections before the acquiring authority and the latter, in turn, was also correspondingly absolved of its duty to hear the petitioners. He further urged that the tests involved for the application of urgency clause do not stand fulfilled in the present case. Mr. R.D. Rane, the learned Assistant Government Pleader, countered these submissions contending that the State was entitled to apply the urgency clause to a given case and in this particular case, according to him, the application was more than justified and this Court, therefore, should not interfere with the impugned acquisition. Considering the rival submissions of the respective Advocates in the light of the record, we are of the view that the contentions raised before us by the learned Advocate for the petitioners are sound and justified and accepting the same, this petition deserves to be allowed.

5. Now, none can dispute the position that acquisition of land for the purpose of providing house sites to landless workers and their families and for extension of gaothan would indeed, be an acquisition pre - eminently for a public purpose nor can there be two opinions on the fact that this public purpose particularly providing house sites to landless workers and their families is, indeed, one which all would desire to be implemented efficiently and even expeditiously. But this, therefore, cannot per se justify stamping a land acquisition notification in that behalf with the impress and insignia of an urgency clause. That a given purpose is laudable is not by itself sufficient to vindicate the application of urgency clause so as to obviate even the minimum requirement of