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2026 Supreme(Cal) 73

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
DEBANGSU BASAK, MD. SHABBAR RASHIDI, JJ.
Kamlesh Kumar Agarwala – Appellant
Versus
The Estate of Manjan Devi Patni, Represented by Nirmal Kumar Jain – Respondent
APO No. 27 of 2021, AP No. 74 of 2019
Decided On : 20-05-2026

Advocates Appeared:
For the Appellants : Uttam Sharma, Vrinda Kedia
For the Respondents: Rajeev Kr. Jain, Kunal Shaw, Yamini Mahanka

The benefit of excluding time under the law of limitation for proceedings initiated in a wrong forum is contingent upon the applicant demonstrating due diligence and bona fide conduct. Challenging an order of return for lack of jurisdiction, rather than re-filing, negates the claim for such exclusion.

Headnote:(A) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 34(3) - Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 14 - Challenge to arbitral award - Exclusion of time spent in wrong forum - The benefit of excluding time under statutory limitations requires bona fide prosecution with due diligence in a court lacking jurisdiction. Pursuing a revision petition against a judicial order directing the return of an application, rather than re-filing in the appropriate court, indicates a lack of bona fide and prevents the exclusion of time. (Paras 17, 24, 25, 27, 30, 31, 35, 36)

(B) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - Order VII Rule 10 - Return of application - When an application is returned for presentation before the correct legal forum, the applicant is obligated to explain any delay in re-filing and demonstrate that the time spent in the incorrect forum was pursued in good faith to avail the benefit of statutory time exclusions. (Paras 26, 28)

Facts of the case:
The appellant challenged an arbitral award before a court lacking requisite jurisdiction. The court ordered the return of the application for presentation before the competent authority. Instead of immediately re-filing in the proper forum, the appellant filed a revision petition against the order of return, which was rejected, resulting in a fresh application being filed beyond the prescribed period dictated by law for challenging an award.

Findings of Court:
The court determined that the appellant failed to demonstrate the requisite due diligence required under the law of limitation. The decision to challenge a return-of-plaint order through a revision petition, rather than complying with the order by approaching the competent court, was not a bona fide step. Consequently, the period spent in the revision proceedings was not eligible for exclusion.

Issues: Whether the appellant is entitled to exclude the period of time spent prosecuting proceedings in a court lacking jurisdiction and a subsequent unsuccessful revision petition while calculating the limitation period for challenging an arbitral award.

Ratio Decidendi: The principle of excluding time for proceedings prosecuted in good faith in a wrong forum is conditional upon the party acting with due diligence. Where a party engages in prolonged litigation against a clear order of returning their application for lack of jurisdiction, such conduct signifies an absence of bona fide intent, precluding the benefit of time exclusion under the statute.

Result: Appeal dismissed.

Table of Content
1. factual history and procedural background of the arbitration challenge and territorial jurisdiction. (Para 1 , 2 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 16)
2. summary of contentions by parties regarding limitation period and bona fide prosecution of proceedings. (Para 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9)
3. analysis of section 14 of the limitation act requirements and the necessity of due diligence. (Para 17 , 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 22 , 23 , 24 , 25 , 26 , 27 , 28 , 29 , 30 , 31 , 32 , 33 , 34)
4. lack of bona fide effort in pursuing legal remedies bars the benefit of section 14. (Para 35 , 36 , 37 , 38)

JUDGMENT :

MD. SHABBAR RASHIDI, J.

1. The appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is in assailment of impugned judgment and order dated March 2, 2020 passed in A.P. No. 74 of 2019, G.A. No. 399 of 2019.

2. By the impugned judgment and order, the learned Single Judge rejected the challenge to the arbitral award dated February 28, 2018 and dismissed A.P. No. 74 of 2019 on the ground that challenge under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 was filed after the expiry of the time period prescribed under Section 34 (3) of the Act of 1996. The learned Trial Judge held that:

“It is not in dispute that the respondents filed the application under Section 29A of the Act of 1996, before a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, for extension of time for making the award by the Arbitrator. By order dated September 05, 2017 a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, in presence of the petitioner, extended the time to make and publish the award of the Arbitrator. A copy of the said order has been disclosed by the respondents in their affidavit and from a reading thereof, it is evident that the petitioner did not raise any objection to the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the said application. Further, the petitioner accepted the said order dated September 05, 2017 and thereafter participated in the arbitral proceeding conducted by the Arbitrator. In the application filed in Misc. Case No.298 of 2018 before the learned District Judge at Alipore, the petitioner did not challenge the impugned award on the ground that the order dated September 05, 2017 passed by this Court was without jurisdiction and consequently, the impugned award made by the Arbitrator after termination of his mandate which took place before passing of the said order is also without jurisdiction and void. In the application filed in Misc. Case No.298 of 2018 the petitioner had not at all mentioned about the filing of the said application under Section 29A of the Act of 1996 before this Court or passing of the said order dated September 05, 2017 by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court. For all the forgoing reasons, I unable to convince myself to accept that the petitioner had prosecuted the said Misc. Case No. 298 of 2018 before the learned District Judge at Alipore with due diligence or in good faith. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. In the facts of the present case the decision of the Supreme Court in Modern Construction & Company (supra) is of no assistance to the petitioner. Accordingly, the application A.P. No.74 of 2019 filed by the petitioner for setting aside of the impugned award, beyond the period of the time stipulated in sub-Section (3) of Section 34 of the Act 1996 read with the Proviso thereto cannot be entertained and the same stands rejected.”

3. It is submitted on behalf of the appellant that the impugned judgment and order was passed without application of judicial mind and is erroneous in law. The same was passed in complete ignorance of the legal propositions governing the field. Learned advocate for the appellant submitted that the learned Trial Court came to an erroneous finding that the appellants did not pursue Misc. Case No. 298 of 2018 under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 as well as C.O. No. 3328 of 2018 in good faith and with due diligence, as such, the appellant was n

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