The exemplification of evidential requirements under the SCST Act highlights that mere membership to a scheduled category does not automatically substantiate charges without compelling evidence.

1. In this criminal appeal the challenge levied is to the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 4-10-2002 passed by Special Judge constituted under Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (in brevity 'SCST Ac') in Special Case No. 151/2001 whereby and whereunder he convicted and sentenced the appellant as under:

2. In brief the prosecution story is that prosecutrix is a resident of village Dabpali. On 1-7-2001 at about 5.30 am she was returning back to her house after dumping the garbage and cow dung in heap. Near the Holedand the appellant stopped her way, demanded sex from her, caught hold her right hand. Prosecutrix twitched him and came back to her house: She narrated about the incident to her father - in - law and her husband. A meeting was convened in the village where the appellant admitted alleged allegation. On the very day the prosecutrix lodged the report in police station Pithaora. After conclusion of the trial a charge sheet under S.354 of the IPC and S.3(1)(xi) of the SCST Act was filed against the appellant. The trial Court framed the charges against the appellant under S.341, S.354, IPC read with S.3(1)(xi), SCST Act. The appellant abjured the charges and faced trial. To bring home the charges prosecution examined as many as 7 witnesses. Appellant examined one witness on his defence.

3. After conclusion of the trial, Trial Court convicted and sentenced the appellant as aforesaid.

4. Counsel for the appellant argued that Trial Court has not appreciated the evidence in proper perspective. The conviction and sentence of the appellant are bad in eyes of law. Thus, appellant may be acquitted of the aforesaid charges.

5. Counsel for the State argued that the conviction and sentence of the appellant are based on clinching evidence. The conviction and sentence of the appellant do not call for interference by this Court.

6. P.W. 1 the prosecutrix says in paras 2 and 3 of her statement given on oath that when she was returning back after dumping the garbage in the heap, on the way, the appellant met her and uttered rubbish words, caught hold her hand. In the meeting the appellant had admitted the alleged allegations.

7. P.W. 2 Neel Kumar says in para 2 of his statement given on oath that in the meeting the appellant had admitted the allegations.

8. P.W.3 Khemraj says in para 2 of his statement given on oath that he had seen that the appellant had caught hold hand of the prosecutrix.

9. P.W. 7 Dhaniram says in para 3 of his statement given on oath that in the meeting the appellant had admitted the allegations.

10. D.W. 1 Ghasiram says that in the meeting the appellant had told that he does not know anything, the prosecutrix had not stated anything against the appellant.

11. There is no such evidence on record on the strength of which it can be said that P.W. 1 Prosecutrix, P.W. 2 Neel Kumar, P.W. 3 Khemraj, P.W. 7 Dhaniram had made aforesaid statements because the appellant was member of opposite party.

12. In FIR Ex. P - 1 which was lodged promptly it has been mentioned that the appellant had caught hold the right hand of the prosecutrix and prevented her to go on the way. The appellant had also admitted the allegations in the meeting which was convened.

13. There is no such evidence on record on strength of which it can be said that lodging of Ex. P - 1 is an afterthought to falsely implicate the appellant.

14. There is no such evidence on record on the strength of which it can be said that aforesaid statements of P.W. 1 Prosecutrix, P.W. 2 Neel Kumar, P.W.3 Khemraj, P.W. 7 Dhaniram are not simple, not natural, and not normal.

15. Looking to the above - mentioned facts and circum