The delay in appeals must meet the sufficient cause standard, and lack of supporting evidence renders applications for condonation insufficient.

1. By this order I.A. No. 1/2019 application for condonation of delay in filing the FA is being disposed of.

2. Respondent had filed a civil suit against the appellant for recovery of Rs. 1,84,000/-.

3. The Civil Suit No. 8 - B / 2014 filed by the respondent was decreed by 3rd Addl District Judge, Bilaspur vide judgment and decree dated 9-2 - 2017. The appellant was ordered to pay Rs. 1,84,000/- to respondent within a period of 2 months along with 6% per annum interest.

4. Being aggrieved, the appellant preferred the First Civil Appeal before this Court along with an application under O.44 R.1 of the CPC.

5. In brief, the appellant's case regarding I. A. No. 1 is that on account of ailment and on account of loss of memory he had forgotten everything, after a big gap of time when he recovered he could remember that decree has (been passed against him. He had not taken the treatment from any doctor. Therefore, the delay may be condoned.

6. In brief case of respondent No. 1 regarding I.A. No. 1 is that appeal is barred by 798 days. No medical documents have been produced by the appellant. Delay is not explained sufficiently. Thus, I.A. No. 1 may be rejected.

7. In the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari , AIR 1969 SC 575 , it has been observed in para 7 as under: -
"7. The next question is whether the delay in filing the certified copy or, to put it differently, the delay in refiling the appeal with the certified copy should be condoned under S.5 of the Limitation Act . If the appellant makes out sufficient cause for the delay, the Court may in its discretion condone the delay. As laid down in Krishna v. Chathappan [ILR (1890) 13 Madras 269, 271] "S.5 gives the courts a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words "sufficient cause" receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the appellant."

8. In the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy [ (1998) 7 SCC 123 : (AIR 1998 SC 3222)] it has been observed in paras 9 to 13 that
"9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. S.5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court.
10. The reason for such a different stance is thus:
The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time - limit fixed fo