Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation

2026 Supreme(Online)(Chh) 10748

IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Parth Prateem Sahu, Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal, JJ
Akanksha Bhardwaj – Appellant
Versus
State Of Chhattisgarh – Respondent
WA No. 34 of 2026

Advocates:
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Akanksha Bhardwaj
For the Respondents: Gairy Mukhopadhyay, Amrito Das

A probationer in judicial service does not attain deemed confirmation upon the expiry of the maximum probation period; service continues as a probationer until an express order of confirmation is passed by the competent authority. Termination for non-confirmation is not a disciplinary penalty and does not require complex inquiry procedures.

Headnote:(A) Judicial Service Rules - Rule 11 - Probation - Termination of Service - Rule 11(5) and (6) mandate that a probationer continues as such until a conscious decision by the competent authority, via an order, confirms their service - There is no concept of 'deemed confirmation' merely upon expiry of the probation period - Termination of a probationer not amounting to a penalty does not require compliance with Article 311(2) requirements like a full departmental inquiry. (Paras 14, 15, 16)

(B) Administrative Law - Conduct of Service - Authority of Standing Committee - Recommendations by a Committee for termination of a probationer for non-confirmation do not equate to 'dismissal' under Rule 4-O, which requires a Full Court meeting - Such matters fall under residuary administrative powers of the Committee. (Paras 22, 23)

(C) Natural Justice - Termination of Probationer - Communication of adverse remarks - Non-communication of adverse material does not vitiate the termination of a probationer where the decision is based on an overall assessment of performance and is not arbitrary. (Paras 26, 27)

Facts of the case:
The appellant, a judicial officer appointed on probation, had her service terminated. Following a prior litigation, the appellant was reinstated as a probationer. Subsequently, the committee recommended her termination based on performance assessments. The appellant challenged the termination, claiming deemed confirmation after the maximum probation period, asserting that the committee lacked authority to recommend termination, and arguing that non-communication of adverse performance reports vitiated the decision.

Findings of Court:
The court held that the legislative framework governing the judicial service explicitly requires a formal, conscious order of confirmation by the competent authority. A probationer holds no right to the post and remains in that status until specifically confirmed or terminated. The distinction between 'termination' for non-confirmation and 'dismissal' for misconduct is clear and legally significant, placing the former within the committee's administrative ambit.

Issues: Whether the appellant attained the status of a confirmed employee through 'deemed confirmation' upon the expiry of the probation period, and whether the committee had the jurisdiction to recommend the termination of a probationer.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the service rules mandate an express order for confirmation following an assessment of performance, the doctrine of deemed confirmation cannot be invoked. A probationer does not possess a vested right to the post, and their termination for non-confirmation does not necessitate the procedural safeguards reserved for disciplinary dismissals.

Result: Appeal dismissed.

Table of Content
1. summary of litigation history and factual trigger for appeal. (Para 1 , 2)
2. appellant's claim of deemed confirmation and procedural illegality. (Para 3 , 4 , 5 , 6)
3. respondent's contention on probation status and committee jurisdiction. (Para 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12)
4. requirement of conscious decision for confirmation precludes deemed confirmation. (Para 13 , 14 , 15 , 16)
5. standing committee's competence to recommend termination of probationer. (Para 17 , 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 22 , 23)
6. non-communication of acr does not vitiate probationer termination. (Para 24 , 25 , 26 , 27 , 28 , 29)

AFR

C A V Order

Per Parth Prateem Sahu, Judge

1. Appellant by this appeal has questioned the legality and sustainability of the impugned order dated 03.12.2025, passed in WPS No. 2942 of 2025, whereby learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by appellant against the order of termination dated 14.01.2025.

2. Facts relevant for disposal of this appeal are that appellant was initially appointed on the post of Civil Judge (Entry Level) vide her letter of appointment dated 12.12.2013. Period of probation according to order of appointment was two years. Period of probation of appellant along with other judicial officers was extended on 18.03.2016. On 09.02.2017 appellant was terminated from service. Order of termination was challenged by appellant by way of filing writ petition bearing WPS No.2206 of 2017, which came to be allowed in part vide order dated 01.05.2024. Order passed by learned Single Judge in WPS No.2206 of 2017 was put to challenge in writ appeal by respondent No.2/High Court of C.G. bearing WA No.363 of 2024 and appellant herein also questioned the order passed in earlier writ petition bearing WPS No.2206 of 2017 in WA No.362 of 2024 claiming back wages. Both the writ appeals came to be dismissed vide order dated 20.09.2024 and Division Bench of this Court affirmed the order passed in WPS No.2206 of 2017. Appellant was reinstated in service vide order dated 28.11.2024 and she was posted as Fourth Civil Judge Class-II at Mahasamund to which she joined on 04.12.2024. Vide order dated 14.01.2025, petitioner was terminated and order of termination was communicated to her on 15.01.2025. Order of termination was put to challenge in WPS No.2942 of 2025, which came to be dismissed by impugned order.

3. Appellant-in-person submits that writ petition filed by her bearing WPS No.2206 of 2017 was allowed in part and learned Single Judge while passing the order of reinstatement has further observed that reinstatement of appellant with continuity of service but without back-wages. As there is order of continuity of service and appellant was initially appointed on the post of Civil Judge vide appointment letter dated 12.12.2013 with a conditions mentioned therein that period of probation is of two years and even considering the extension of probation period of one year, appellant has been confirmed in service by virtue of Rule 11 of the Chhattisgarh Lower Judicial Service (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2006 (In short ‘the Rules, 2006’). It is contention of appellant that under Rule 11 of the Rules, 2006, maximum period of probation has been clearly stipulated of four years, therefore, language used in Rule 11 (3) of the Rules, 2006 after four years of maximum period of probation, appellant got automatically confirmed in service, therefore, appellant is having protection under Article 311 of the Constitution of India. She submits that her services could not have been terminated without holding due departmental enquiry against her. She contended that there is no mention of issuing of an order of confirmation under Rule 11 of the Rules, 2006. Amendment incorporated under Rule 11 (1) and Rule 11 (3) came into force w.e.f. 08.06.2021 and 19.12.2024 respectively. Appointment of appellant was prior to that, therefore, rules applicable to the services of appellant in facts of the case in partic

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2026 Supreme(Online)(Chh) 10748

IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPURParth Prateem Sahu, Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal, JJAkanksha Bhardwaj – AppellantVersusState Of Chhattisgarh – RespondentWA No. 34 of 2026

Cases Referred (8)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Parth Prateem Sahu, Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal, JJ
Akanksha Bhardwaj – Appellant
Versus
State Of Chhattisgarh – Respondent
WA No. 34 of 2026