STATE OF CHHATTISGARH vs SMT. SUREKHA DHANKAR - 2026 Supreme(Online)(Chh) 21139

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2026 Supreme(Online)(Chh) 21139

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Ramesh Sinha, CJ, Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J
STATE OF CHHATTISGARH – Appellant
Versus
SMT. SUREKHA DHANKAR – Respondent
WA No. 573 of 2026

Important Points

Government departments are not entitled to mechanical condonation of delay based on bureaucratic red-tape; they must demonstrate 'sufficient cause' and diligence, as the law of limitation applies equally to the State and private litigants.

Subject

Civil Law - Limitation

Act Referred

Limitation Act, 1908: S.5

Headnote

The matter involves an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, where the State sought to condone a delay of 243 days in filing a writ appeal against an order dated 13.08.2025. The State attributed the delay to departmental formalities and the functioning of government machinery. The Court found that the explanation provided was vague and lacked specificity, failing to establish 'sufficient cause'. The primary issue was whether the State's internal bureaucratic delays constitute 'sufficient cause' for condoning an inordinate delay. The Court reasoned that the law of limitation binds everyone including the Government and that 'condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments'. It emphasized that the discretion to condone delay must be exercised judiciously and not as a matter of generosity, especially when negligence or lack of bona fides is evident. In view of the above, the writ appeal is hereby dismissed on the ground of delay and laches

Advocates:
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Prasoon Bhaduri
For the Respondents: A.N. Pandey, Sourabh Sharma

Table of Content
1. application for condonation of delay based on government procedural formalities. (Para 1 , 2 , 3)
2. the law of limitation applies equally to the state; bureaucratic red-tape is not 'sufficient cause'. (Para 4 , 5 , 6)
3. sufficient cause must arise within the limitation period; courts must not excuse state lethargy. (Para 7 , 8)
4. dismissal of appeal due to failure to provide a cogent explanation for inordinate delay. (Para 9 , 10 , 11)

Order on Board

Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

1. Heard Prasoon Bhaduri, Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State on I.A. No.02 of 2026, which is an application for condonation of delay. Also heard Mr. A.N. Pandey and Mr. Sourabh Sharma, learned counsel for the respective respondents.

2. Learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the State/appellant submits that the learned Single Judge on 13.08.2025 passed the impugned order. Thereafter, the Director, Directorate of Public Instructions, Chhattisgarh, Raipur had sought an opinion from the Office of the Advocate General vide letter dated 02.01.2026. Upon which the Office of the Advocate General vide its letter dated 12.02.2026 has accorded opinion for filing appeal and thereafter proposal has been sent to the Law and Legislative Affairs Department through the Department of Commerce & Industries for sanction and accordingly the sanction for filing appeal has been accorded and thereafter OIC is appointed vide order dated 18.05.2026 and the present appeal is being drafted and filed before this Hon'ble Court.

3. It has been contended that the State, after obtaining necessary documents and information with respect to the case, however, some delay was occurred due to fulfillment of various departmental formalities and working of the Government machinery because the State Government is a multi functioning body, hence, at times the fulfillment of departmental formalities takes unexpected long time. Therefore, in some cases the State is prevented from filing the case within the prescribed period of limitation, which is bonafide and not deliberate. The instant appeal is, therefore, being filed after a delay of 243 days from the prescribed period of limitation. Reliance has been placed upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Nagaland Vs. LipokAo [(2005) 3 SCC Page 372], to buttress his submissions. As such, the learned State counsel prays that the delay of 243 days in preferring the petition may be condoned.

4. The question for determination before this Court is whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (i.e. Act 9 of 1908 i.e. the old Limitation Act) would apply to an application for condonation of delay.

5. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Postmaster General and others v. Living Media India Limited and another , (2012) 3 SCC 563, has dealt with the limitation issue and held as under:-

“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be ac